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ARTICLES
THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND
THE FALSE PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM
Thomas B. Colby*
This Article approaches the originalism debate from a new angle—
through the lens of the recently defeated Federal Marriage Amendment.
There was profound and very public disagreement about the meaning of the
FMA—in particular about the effect that it would have had on civil unions.
The inescapable conclusion is that there was no original public meaning of
the FMA with respect to the civil unions question. This suggests that often
the problem with originalism is not just that the original public meaning of
centuries-old provisions of the Constitution is hard to find (especially by
judges untrained in history). The problem is frequently much more fundamental, and much more fatal; it is that there was no original public meaning to begin with. It is a natural consequence of the constitution-making
process that a constitutional provision addressing a deeply controversial subject can only be enacted when it is drafted with highly ambiguous language
so that, rather than possessing a single original meaning, it appeals to disparate factions with divergent understandings of its terms. As such, the central
premise of originalism—that, in Justice Scalia’s words, the Constitution was
enacted with “a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law”—is often inaccurate. And for that reason,
the central promise of originalism—that, by relying on an objective, discoverable, fixed constitutional meaning, originalism can prevent judges from subverting democracy and the rule of law by reading their personal values into
the Constitution—is a false one.
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INTRODUCTION
The originalist school of constitutional interpretation blossomed in
the 1980s in response to the perceived judicial activism of the Warren
and Burger Courts.1 In asserting the existence of an objective, discoverable, fixed constitutional meaning capable of directing judicial decisionmaking in a value-neutral manner, originalism made an enticing promise—a way to ensure that judges do not subvert democracy and the rule of
law by reading their personal values into the Constitution.2
This was an enticing promise, to be sure, but it was one that originalism initially could not keep. As first conceived, originalism was a jurisprudence of original intent. It sought to interpret the Constitution according to the subjective intentions of those who framed it: The Constitution
means what the Framers intended it to mean.3 That theory was sharply
criticized on a number of fronts, most convincingly for two seemingly
insurmountable flaws. First, it is a fool’s errand to attempt to ascertain
the collective intent of a large group of individuals, each of whom may
well have been motivated by differing desires.4 Second, much of the historical evidence indicates that the Framers themselves manifestly did not
intend for the Constitution to be interpreted according to their subjective intentions.5 Thus, a jurisprudence of original intent is both impossible (there was no single original intent of the diverse Framers) and selfdefeating (in order to faithfully follow the original intent of the Framers,
one must not follow the original intent of the Framers). As such, it obviously could not follow through on its promise to deliver us from judicial
activism.
These withering critiques were successful in defeating the theory of
original intent, but not in putting an end to the originalist movement.
Far from it, in fact. Originalism has transformed itself to deflect these
criticisms, and in so doing, it has reemerged much stronger. As Justice
Scalia—originalism’s leading champion—has explained, today’s originalists seek “the original meaning of the text, not what the original drafts1. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599,
599–603 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism].
2. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove’s Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 Ind. L.J.
619, 647 (1996); Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 928, 943 (1997)
(noting this promise).
3. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 5, 10–11 (1988) [hereinafter Meese, Original Intent].
4. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. Rev. 204, 209–17 (1980).
5. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 885, 903–13 (1985).
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men intended.”6 Rather than looking to uncover the subjective intentions of the Framers, the focus of the modern originalist inquiry is on the
original, objective public meaning of the text. “All that counts,” explains
Judge Robert Bork, “is how the words used in the Constitution would
have been understood at the time.”7
This redirected focus on original meaning, rather than original intent, ostensibly avoids both the problem of determining the collective intent of the numerous Framers (the Framers may have had many reasons
for enacting it, but the text nonetheless had only one meaning8) and the
problem of self-defeat (much of the historical evidence that was mustered
to undermine the reliance on original intent actually supports the reliance on original meaning by suggesting that the Framers believed that
the original meaning of the text, rather than the original intent of the
drafters, would control future constitutional interpretation9). Originalists thus believe that the new, “original meaning originalism” overcomes
the most prominent objections to the old, “original intent originalism,”
while at the same time fulfilling the central promise of the originalist
enterprise: the ability to provide a neutral, objective method of constitutional decisionmaking.
Indeed, the new originalism, almost every bit as much as its failed
forerunner, stakes its claim on its ability to overcome “the main danger in
judicial interpretation of the Constitution[:] . . . that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”10 Originalists cast their theory
as a “safeguard against political judging” and a “vindication of democracy

6. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of
Interpretation 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter, Scalia, Common-Law Courts].
For discussion of the evolution of originalist thought from original intent to original
meaning, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611,
620–29 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, An Originalism]; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J.
1113, 1134–48 (2003); Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning?
On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 Okla. L.
Rev. 1, 3–11 (2007); Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 1, at 603–07.
7. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 144 (1990) [hereinafter Bork,
Tempting].
8. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as
Radical as It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 258 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping
Precedent] (“That there is a unique original public meaning is a far more plausible claim
than that one can discern a unique original intention from the potentially conflicting
intentions of various framers.”).
9. See Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 621, 627–28.
10. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 863 (1989)
[hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil]. As one prominent originalist has written, “the arguments
on behalf of originalism . . . are preoccupied utterly with the examination of judicial
power’s legitimacy.” Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 283, 284 (1996).
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against unprincipled judicial activism.”11 Enforcing the original meaning
of the text ensures that the judge will give force to the will of the people—either the current majority that enacted the law under review, or
the supermajority that assented to the Constitution.12 Any other form of
constitutional interpretation, originalists assert, “must end in constitutional nihilism and the imposition of the judge’s merely personal values
on the rest of us.”13
The primary attraction of originalism thus lies in its promise to rescue democracy from judicial subjectivity. As one scholar recently put it,
“originalism is said to tame the monster of judicial activism by teaching
that a conscientious inquiry into historical sources will yield the original
meaning of constitutional text and thereby provide a reliable and objective basis for constitutional adjudication.”14
The new originalism, reconstructed in terms of original public meaning, is a theory on the rise. So powerful is its lure—so tempting is its
promise—that it has seduced at least two, and perhaps four, Justices of
the Supreme Court.15 And it has become so successful in the academy
that one prominent constitutional scholar has concluded that it “is now
the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation.”16
But can the new originalism really do what the old originalism could
not? Can it, in fact, keep its promise of enabling judges to reach objective
answers to constitutional questions without reference to their own predilections? In other words—leaving aside the prodigious debate about the
theoretical desirability and normative “correctness” of originalism—is it is
even possible to implement originalism at all? Can a judge who is convinced that originalism makes sense in theory actually apply it successfully
in practice?
Many critics of originalism believe not. Their argument typically
comes in a soft version—originalism is possible, but it cannot be done by
11. Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 146, 164; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Strict adherence to this [originalist] approach is
essential if we are to . . . [avoid] infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political
views.”); BeVier, supra note 10, at 287–88 (“A further virtue of originalism is the
impersonality of its decisionmaking criteria.”).
12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1043 (2004) (noting
this originalist belief).
13. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. L.J. 383, 387 (1985).
To be sure, some modern academic originalists do not ground their support for
originalism on its promise to curb judicial discretion. Still, their originalism necessarily
remains premised on the underlying assumption about the existence of an original
meaning that this Article seeks to question. See infra note 385.
14. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1.
15. See id. at 3 & nn.5–6 (discussing avowed originalism of Justices Scalia and Thomas
and noting that, in their confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito also
expressed sympathy with originalism).
16. Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 613.
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untrained lawyers and judges17—and a hard version—originalism is not
possible at all because the original meaning of most constitutional provisions has been lost in the intervening centuries and cannot be rediscovered today by examination of the incomplete and often untrustworthy
historical record.18
Originalists recognize these difficulties. Justice Scalia, for instance,
admits that, because “it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text,” this is “a task sometimes better
suited to the historian than the lawyer.”19 But originalists remain confident that judges, with the help of historians, can overcome these obstacles. The historical record is, originalists believe, on the whole complete
and reliable enough to illuminate the original meaning of the constitutional text in the vast majority of cases.20
Both this defense of originalism and the criticism to which it is responding are based on an underlying assumption that there was an original meaning of the Constitution. The dispute is over whether or not
judges can accurately discover it.21 This Article questions that assumption by approaching the originalism debate from a new angle—through
the lens of the recently defeated amendment to the Federal Constitution
that would have banned same-sex marriage: the Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA).22 Although the FMA gained majority support in
both Houses of Congress, and would very likely have been ratified had it
been sent to the states, it failed to receive the required two-thirds congressional vote. This Article asks what would have happened if it had passed.
17. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,
49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1989) (arguing that complexity of historical record “do[es]
not mean that historical investigation is hopeless” because “[h]istorians learn to make
sophisticated credibility judgments” about records, “[b]ut judges may be ill-prepared to
make such judgments”).
18. See, e.g., Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: Rethinking the Use
of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 475, 477 (2006) (collecting
sources arguing “that the historical record is too incomplete or inconclusive for modernday readers to pinpoint the Framers’ original meaning”).
19. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 856–57.
20. See, e.g., Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 165 (arguing that, while “some
meanings will be doubtful or even lost, . . . much that is certain or probable remains”);
Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 649–50 (“Compelling analyses of the original
meaning of even the most controversial provisions of the Constitution have been
developed . . . . [T]he past fifteen years has yielded a boon tide of originalist scholarship
that has established the original meanings of several clauses . . . previously . . . shrouded in
mystery primarily for want of serious inquiry.” (footnotes omitted)).
21. See, e.g., Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 165 (admitting that on “rare occasions”
a judge may not be able to determine original meaning, but that is because “the original
understanding really is lost,” not because it never existed); Barnett, An Originalism, supra
note 6, at 649 (“[T]hat which exists is possible to exist.”).
22. The proposed amendment was initially dubbed the Federal Marriage Amendment
and was later renamed the Marriage Protection Amendment. See infra Part I.
Throughout this Article, I will generally use the original title, often abbreviated as the
“FMA,” or simply the “Amendment.”
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In particular, it asks how an originalist judge would have gone about ascertaining its original public meaning and applying that meaning to resolve what would certainly have become the central interpretive question
posed by the FMA: the constitutionality of civil unions of the type authorized in Vermont and a number of other states.
In Part I, I set out in considerable detail the history of the drafting
and consideration of the FMA, explaining the extent to which there was
profound and very public disagreement about the meaning of the
Amendment—in particular about the effect that it would have had on
civil unions. The Amendment was highly ambiguous on this issue, and
that ambiguity was essential to its hopes of accumulating the broad-based
support needed for passage. The Amendment came close to succeeding
only because both those who supported civil unions (but not gay marriage)
and those who opposed civil unions (along with gay marriage) understood
it to reflect their views.
Part II explains that, in light of this history, the inescapable conclusion is that there was no original public meaning of the Federal Marriage
Amendment with respect to civil unions. It was facially ambiguous and
meant very different things to different people; no one could possibly
have known whether it did or did not permit civil unions. As such, had it
been ratified, a judge committed to the originalist enterprise in interpreting it would have been at a loss. To resolve the civil unions question, she
would have been forced to look elsewhere—to some form of nonoriginalist constitutional interpretation.
Part III steps back from the FMA to make a broader point about the
viability of originalism in general. The example of the FMA provides
compelling evidence that often the problem with originalism is not just
that the original public meaning of centuries-old provisions of the
Constitution is hard to find (especially by judges untrained in history).
The problem is frequently much more fundamental, and much more fatal: There was no original public meaning to begin with. And because it is of
course not possible to find and apply that which has never existed, in
many instances originalism, as a viable form of constitutional interpretation, is a nonstarter. In other words, the central premise of originalism—
that the Constitution “has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law”23—is often inaccurate.
And thus, the central promise of originalism—that it can effectively eliminate judicial subjectivity—is a false one. However desirable originalism
may appear in theory, it is quite often simply not possible in practice.
This Article is not grounded in a deconstructionist argument that
language inherently has no objective meaning, such that all written instruments are inevitably ambiguous. Nor does it suggest that the
23. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 854; see also Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at
2 (noting that originalism is premised on notion that constitutional principles “are known
and constrain judges”).
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Constitution in all particulars lacks an original public meaning. It argues
instead that it is wrong to assume—as originalism generally does—that
the fact that a constitutional provision was enacted necessarily means that
there was supermajority support for (or at least willingness to go along
with) a particular political or legal principle objectively reflected in its
text. That assumption surely holds true for some constitutional provisions, and the original meaning of those provisions may well be ascertainable through historical inquiry. But political realities dictate that constitutional provisions of a certain type, of which the FMA is a striking
example, tend not to have a single, original public meaning. It would
certainly have been possible, as a textual matter, to draft the FMA unambiguously to allow, or preclude, civil unions. But had the FMA been so
drafted, it would have been impossible, as a political matter, to enact it.
The FMA serves as a uniquely compelling illustration of the proposition
that, as a natural consequence of the constitution-making process, a constitutional provision addressing a deeply controversial subject can only
hope to be enacted when it is drafted with highly ambiguous language so
that, rather than possessing a single original meaning, it appeals to disparate factions with divergent understandings of its terms.
Yet it is precisely that category of constitutional provisions—those involving the then- (as now-) controversial subjects of equality, fundamental
rights, and expansive federal power—that engender the greatest fear of
judicial overreaching. As such, originalism will usually fail to live up to its
promise in the very cases to which that promise is most acutely directed.
Whether they like it or not, judges are forced to look beyond the (nonexistent) original meaning in order to answer the constitutional questions
that pose the greatest risk of “judicial activism.” The promise of originalism is thus a false one.
I. CIVIL UNIONS

AND THE

FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

A. The Original Federal Marriage Amendment
In a landmark 1999 opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court interpreted the Vermont State Constitution to require the State “to extend to
same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from
marriage under Vermont law.”24 Although same-sex couples must have
the same right to enter into legally significant partnerships as oppositesex couples, the court held, the legislature need not include their unions
within the institution of “marriage.” The decision whether to situate gay
unions “within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the
Legislature.”25
24. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
25. Id.
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The following year, the Vermont legislature responded by enacting
legislation26 that permits persons of the same sex to enter into “civil unions”—a term defined in the statute to “mean[ ] that two eligible persons
have established a relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive
the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
spouses.”27 The statute explicitly mandates that “[p]arties to a civil union
shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under
law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy,
common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in
a marriage.”28 Thus, “[p]arties to a civil union shall be responsible for
the support of one another to the same degree and in the same manner
as prescribed under law for married persons,” and “[t]he law of domestic
relations, including annulment, separation and divorce, child custody
and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union.”29
Yet for all of that, the statute also purports to make clear that a civil
union is not a marriage. The legislative findings accompanying the Civil
Unions Bill begin with an emphatic declaration that “[c]ivil marriage
under Vermont’s marriage statutes consists of a union between a man
and a woman,” and thus the “system of civil unions does not bestow the
status of civil marriage.”30 Accordingly, in Vermont, “marriage” remains
an institution available only to opposite-sex couples, but each and every
one of the legal rights associated with marriage is now equally available to
same-sex couples.
The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision raised fears among social
conservatives around the country that other courts would soon follow suit
and find a state or federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage or
civil unions. The only sure-fire way to avoid that result, those conservatives felt, was to amend the Federal Constitution.31 Hence, the birth of
the Federal Marriage Amendment.
In the spring and summer of 2001, a small group of legal scholars
hammered out the text of the Federal Marriage Amendment through a

26. Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72 (codified at Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002)).
27. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1201(2). To be eligible for a civil union, applicants must
“[b]e of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state.” Id.
§ 1202(2).
28. Id. § 1204(a).
29. Id. § 1204(c), (d).
30. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72.
31. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and Sexual Liberation: Courts
and the Abolition of Marriage, 17 Regent U. L. Rev. 21, 29–30 (2004) [hereinafter George,
Judicial Usurpation]; Robert Bork, Op-Ed., Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, Wall
St. J., Aug. 7, 2001, at A14 [hereinafter Bork, Stop Courts].
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series of email and telephone conversations.32 The Amendment was
principally authored by three prominent academics: Professor Robert
George of Princeton University, Professor Gerard Bradley of Notre Dame
Law School, and Judge Robert Bork, formerly of Yale Law School.33
Those three scholars settled on the following language, which was formally announced in July 2001 by the Alliance for Marriage, an organization of conservative religious leaders created for the purpose of endorsing the Amendment:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution
of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.34
What do those words mean? What would this proposed amendment
have accomplished if it had become part of our Constitution? Surely, it
would have prohibited state or federal courts from announcing a constitutional right to same-sex “marriage” denominated as such. And surely it
would have prohibited Congress and the state legislatures from extending the statutory right to “marriage” to same-sex couples. But what
about civil unions? Would it have permitted state governments to establish them, or would it instead have rendered any such state laws
unconstitutional?
That question could not possibly have been unanticipated by the
Amendment’s authors. After all, the Amendment was drafted on the immediate heels of the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision and the
Vermont legislature’s statutory creation of civil unions in response.
When the FMA was being drafted, civil unions were front and center of
the gay marriage debate.
Nor would this have been an inconsequential, academic question.
Opinion polls have generally concluded that, although most Americans
do not support extending marriage to gay and lesbian couples, there is
solid majority support for affording same-sex couples at least the right to
enter into civil unions.35 Indeed, a number of states have already followed Vermont’s lead and enacted their own civil union bills affording
gay couples all of the rights of marriage, save only the label, and other
states have enacted “domestic partnership” laws extending virtually all of
the rights of marriage to same-sex couples.36 Momentum for civil unions
32. See Alan Cooperman, Little Consensus on Marriage Amendment: Even Authors
Disagree on the Meaning of Its Text, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter
Cooperman, Little Consensus].
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Many of these polls are collected at Law and Civil Rights, PollingReport.com, at
http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
36. See New Hampshire Law Makes Same-Sex Civil Unions Legal, Boston Globe, June
1, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/06/01/new_
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is growing, and advocates on both sides of the issue recognize that even
more states are likely to follow suit in the near future.37 As such, if the
FMA had become a part of our Constitution, the constitutionality of civil
union laws would have been litigated immediately, and civil unions would
instantly have become the central focus of the struggle to define the
scope of the new constitutional mandate.
So what is the correct answer? Does the Amendment allow the states
to establish civil unions, or not? The question is straightforward and obvious. The answer is anything but.
The Amendment’s first sentence—“Marriage in the United States
shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman”—might seem at
first blush to have nothing to say about civil unions. By its plain terms, it
applies only to marriage. And as the Vermont legislature took pains to
tell us, the “system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil marriage.”38 But two of the three principal authors of the proposed
Amendment disagree. Professors George and Bradley contend that,
properly interpreted, this first sentence would do more than just prohibit
states from bestowing the title of “marriage” upon same-sex unions. It
would also prohibit the states from bestowing upon gay and lesbian
couples the essential qualities of marriage, regardless of what label the state
chooses to affix upon the same-sex union, “in the same way that, if the
Constitution forbade states from creating ‘navies,’ they clearly could not
establish ‘flotillas’ or ‘armadas,’ either.”39 In other words, the
Constitution protects (and prohibits) substance, not labels. Just as the
government cannot get around the Constitution’s general prohibition on
warrantless searches by authorizing the police to conduct “explorations”
of a suspect’s home without a warrant, Professors George and Bradley
contend that the government would not be able to get around the
Constitution’s would-be prohibition on same-sex marriage by authorizing
same-sex couples to enter into “civil unions” that are identical to marriages in all but name.
Professor George has clarified that, since marriage is inherently a
sexual union, under the FMA, “states may not create ‘faux marriages’ by
predicating rights, benefits, privileges, and immunities on the existence,
recognition, or presumption of sexual conduct or relationships between
unmarried persons.”40 Thus, says George, a state may enact a domestic
partnership or civil union law providing benefits to unmarried couples
only if that law applies broadly to any unmarried adults living together,
hampshire_law_makes_same_sex_civil_unions_legal/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
37. See Anthony Faiola, N.H. Is Set to Approve Same-Sex Civil Unions, Wash. Post,
Apr. 26, 2007, at A1.
38. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72, § 1(10).
39. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32; see also Ramesh Ponnuru, Marriage
Amendment Jitters, Nat’l Rev., Nov. 24, 2003, at 31, 32 [hereinafter Ponnuru, Jitters].
40. George, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 31, at 30.

R
R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-3\COL301.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

25-MAR-08

2008] FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND ORIGINALISM

12:26

539

with no expectation of a sexual relationship between them.41 A civil
union that narrowly targets only same-sex romantic couples is a marriage
by another name, and is therefore prohibited by the FMA.
Professor George believes this mandate to be “implicit in the terms
of the FMA.”42 If he is correct, then the Amendment would preclude a
civil union law like Vermont’s.43 A Vermont-style civil union is no less
premised on the existence of a sexual relationship than is a marriage.
The Vermont legislature’s factfindings make clear that the purpose of the
institution of the civil union is to allow romantically committed same-sex
couples to enter into permanent relationships on the very same terms,
and with the very same benefits, as those available to opposite-sex couples
who choose to enter into marriage.44 Neither civil union laws nor marriage laws make the existence of a sexual relationship an explicit requirement (or even a necessary one, as impotent or celibate couples are free to
enter into marriages and civil unions), but both institutions are implicitly
premised to precisely the same extent on the understanding that there
will generally be a romantic, sexual relationship between the
participants.45
But is Professors George and Bradley’s reading of their Amendment
the correct one? The Amendment’s third principal author, Judge Bork,
has reached the polar opposite conclusion. According to Bork, this “first
sentence means [only] that no legislature may confer the name of marriage
on same-sex unions.” The first sentence does not, says Bork, prohibit
states like Vermont from “enact[ing] a civil-unions law, marriage in all
but name.” Rather, “[s]o far as legislatures are concerned, the primary
41. See id.; Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32 (explaining Professor
George’s view of civil unions under FMA).
42. George, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 31, at 30.
43. See Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 729, 729 (2000) (“Vermont recently became the first American
jurisdiction to legally recognize same-sex ‘marriages,’ calling them (chiefly for political
reasons) ‘civil unions.’”).
44. See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72–73. Thus, a person may not enter into a civil
union in Vermont with a relative. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1203 (2002).
45. As Professors George and Bradley have observed, the law of marriage does, to a
limited degree, recognize the essential role of sexual intercourse in the marital union by
establishing impotence as a legitimate ground for annulment. See Robert P. George &
Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 Geo. L.J. 301, 308 (1995).
But so too does the law of civil unions. Vermont law provides that the “law of domestic
relations, including annulment . . . shall apply to parties to a civil union.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
15, § 1204(d). Thus, Professor George appears to be mistaken (or perhaps disingenuous)
when he declares, in the very same paragraph in which he announces his understanding
that the FMA would foreclose legal recognition of gay unions premised, like marriage, on
the existence of a sexual relationship, that the FMA “preserves the principle of democratic
self-government on the issue of civil unions” and “fail[s] to ban civil unions.” George,
Judicial Usurpation, supra note 31, at 30; see also Robert George, The 28th Amendment,
Nat’l Rev., July 23, 2001, at 32, 34 (arguing that FMA would not ban civil unions).
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thrust of the sentence’s prohibition is symbolic, reserving the name of
marriage to its traditional meaning.”46
Remarkably, even the Amendment’s authors could not agree on the
most fundamental, basic question about the meaning of its opening
sentence.
And that’s the clear sentence. The proposed Amendment’s second
sentence—“Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor
state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups”—is even more ambiguous. Judge Bork insists that this second
sentence precludes courts from mandating civil unions (as the Vermont
Supreme Court had done), but leaves legislatures free to enact them of
their own accord. To Bork, the second sentence “recognizes that liberal
activist courts are the real problem,” and thus leaves “the question of arrangements less than marriage . . . to the determination of the people
through the democratic process.” Indeed, Bork has explicitly declared,
“To try to prevent legislatures from enacting permission for civil unions
by constitutional amendment would be to reach too far.”47 But the actual
language of the second sentence seems hard to square with Judge Bork’s
interpretation. What is a legislatively enacted civil unions law if not a
“state . . . law” that “require[s] that . . . the legal incidents” of “marital
status” “be conferred upon unmarried couples”?
Initially, Judge Bork’s interpretation of both sentences—that they
collectively reserve the word “marriage” for opposite-sex unions alone,
but they allow legislatures (but not courts) to create civil unions or otherwise to bestow marital rights under another name upon same-sex
couples—predominated in the public understanding of the fledgling
FMA. Less than a month after the proposed Amendment was announced, the conservative Family Research Council had already denounced it for allowing states to create civil unions.48 Other conservatives concurred in this interpretation of the Amendment’s limited scope,
but grudgingly accepted it anyway. The National Review’s Stanley Kurtz,
for instance, explained that “[w]orries that liberal states may offer homosexual couples civil unions equivalent to marriage in all but name are
justified. But out of respect to our federal system, the backers of the Federal Marriage Amendment understand that such battles will have to be
fought democratically, on a state-by-state basis.”49 That was indeed the

46. Bork, Stop Courts, supra note 31.
47. Id.
48. See Stanley Kurtz, The Right Balance, Nat’l Rev. Online, Aug. 1, 2001, at http://
www.nationalreview.com/contributors/kurtz080101.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
49. Id.
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expressed view of the Alliance for Marriage—the organization that had
been created to promote the Amendment.50
When the Federal Marriage Amendment was originally introduced
in the House of Representatives in May of 2002,51 it went nowhere. The
following March, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
heard oral argument in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,52 the case
that ultimately established a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts. The Goodridge litigation, and the media frenzy
that it occasioned, reignited the fires of the movement to amend the
Federal Constitution, and the FMA was reintroduced in May 2003 by
Representative Marilyn Musgrave.53 A month later, those fires erupted
into a blaze when the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Lawrence v. Texas 54 invalidating state criminal prohibitions on homosexual sex with reasoning that, according to Justice Scalia’s alarmist
dissent, “dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted
a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions,
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”55 Lawrence and
Goodridge added an element of urgency to the perceived need to use the
constitutional amendment process to preempt a judicial declaration of a
constitutional right to gay unions. In the first month after the Lawrence
decision, the FMA gained fifty new cosponsors, tripling its prior support
and propelling it to the forefront of the congressional agenda.56 The gay
marriage debate in Congress had begun.
Throughout that debate, the FMA’s sponsors stood by Judge Bork’s
and the Alliance for Marriage’s interpretation of the Amendment’s
meaning with regard to civil unions. Representative Musgrave, the
Amendment’s principal sponsor in the House, declared: “The intent
from Day One has been respectful of state legislatures. . . . I don’t support
civil unions, but I’m ready to have those battles state by state.”57 Echoing
Judge Bork’s views, the sponsors sold the Amendment as aimed only at
curtailing “judicial activism.”58 To that end, they insisted that their
Amendment would preclude the courts from “discovering” a state or federal constitutional right to gay marriage or civil unions, but it would not
preclude the state legislatures from democratically creating a right to civil
50. See Alan Cooperman, Opponents of Gay Marriage Divided: At Issue Is Scope of
an Amendment, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Cooperman, Opponents].
51. See H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002).
52. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
53. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
54. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
55. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies in
the Marriage Debate, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 569, 573 (2004).
57. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
58. See Melissa A. Glidden, Recent Development, Federal Marriage Amendment, 41
Harv. J. on Legis. 483, 494–95 (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev. 431, 475–77 (2005).
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unions (though it would preclude them from creating a right to gay marriage). As the Senate Republican Party Committee explained it, “the
amendment is designed to preserve the ability of state legislatures to allocate civil benefits within each State. [Only] [s]tate courts . . . would not be
able to create this new right.”59
The press initially accepted and repeated this understanding. The
Baptist Press, for instance, published an article in July 2003 confidently
declaring that, “[w]hile the amendment would preclude judges from
forcing ‘civil unions’ and same-sex, marriage-like benefits upon states, it
would not prevent state legislatures from continuing to make such
decisions.”60
But not everyone was convinced. Initially, it was the Amendment’s
second sentence that raised concerns. In May 2003, the ACLU issued and
posted on the internet a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee insisting that, contrary to the promises of the Amendment’s sponsors, the
Amendment might well have the effect of voiding legislatively enacted
domestic partnership and civil union laws.61 Two months later, Andrew
Sullivan, a prominent internet columnist, blogger, and well-known conservative advocate for gay rights, reached the same conclusion. Sullivan
charged that the second sentence would bar the states from enacting or
continuing to enforce not only gay marriage laws, but also “all domestic
partnership laws, any state-provided benefits, or any support for same-sex
couples anywhere anyhow.”62
Law professor Eugene Volokh, another prominent blogger, agreed
that the language of the FMA was best read to bar civil unions. Noting
that the second sentence of the Amendment provides that “state . . . law
. . . shall [not] be construed to require that . . . the legal incidents [of
marriage] be conferred upon unmarried couples,” Volokh explained that
that is exactly what civil union laws try to do: confer upon certain unmarried couples all of the rights and benefits—the “legal incidents”—of marriage.63 As such, the FMA would preclude the courts from “construing” a
state civil union law to do what it purports to do. Thus, if the legislature
59. U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., The Threat to Marriage from the Courts
11 (July 29, 2003), available at http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/2003/jd072903.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
60. Tom Strode, Marriage Protection Amendment Gets Push After Court Ruling,
Baptist Press, July 1, 2003, at http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id=16215 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
61. Letter from ACLU to Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee Urging
Opposition to H.J. Res. 56, the Marriage Constitutional Amendment (May 23, 2003), at
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/12063leg20030523.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
62. Posting of Andrew Sullivan to andrewsullivan.com, http://time-blog.com/
daily_dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2003_07_01_dish_archive.html (July 10, 2003,
14:56 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
63. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
2003_07_06_volokh_archive.html#105786956006497748 (July 10, 2003, 13:39 EST) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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of a state were to enact a civil union law—requiring state and local officials to treat such unions as tantamount to marriages—state judges and
officials would be precluded by the FMA from giving it effect.64
Ramesh Ponnuru, a writer for the National Review, immediately disagreed with Sullivan and Volokh and insisted that the FMA’s second sentence would not prohibit state legislative attempts to extend marital rights
to same-sex couples. According to Ponnuru, that sentence is better read
to apply only to judicial attempts to declare that a law facially granting
benefits only to opposite-sex married couples should somehow be “construed” to extend those benefits to committed same-sex couples; it would
not apply to a law explicitly granting benefits to same-sex couples.65 As
Ponnuru later argued, a benefit should be treated as an “incident of marriage” within the meaning of the second sentence only if the legislature
has chosen to make it available only to married couples. Once a legislature chooses to make it generally available to unmarried couples through
civil unions, it is no longer an incident of marriage, and the Amendment
will no longer preclude the courts and other government officials from
affording it to couples in civil unions.66
Volokh was unconvinced. He explained that “legal incidents of marriage” is an inherently ambiguous phrase. It could be interpreted as
Ponnuru suggested, to refer to “those things that state law provides only
to married couples”; but it could also be interpreted to refer to “those
things that law has traditionally provided only to married couples.”67 Indeed, Volokh cited a number of judicial decisions that have used the
phrase “incidents of marriage” to refer to benefits that are traditionally
afforded to married couples but can also be bestowed upon unmarried
couples. “In all these cases,” explained Volokh, “the courts were treating
64. See id.; Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://
volokh.com/2004_02_08_volokh_archive.html#107636855674742165 (Feb. 9, 2004, 15:15
EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter February Volokh Posting];
Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
2003_07_06_volokh_archive.html (July 10, 2003, 17:50 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
65. See Posting of Ramesh Ponnuru to The Corner, http://corner.nationalreview.
com/post/?q=MzBlMWMwOTg4M2RhNWU0YjhjZThkZDk1NmVjMzQ4NjY= (July 12,
2003, 11:04 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Representative Musgrave later
echoed that, in light of the words “construed to require” that follow it, the “phrase ‘state or
federal law’ means statutory and common laws of general applicability not otherwise
having to do with conferring the legal incidents of marriage on unmarried persons.”
Memorandum from Office of U.S. Representative Marylyn Musgrave, Memorandum
Regarding the Meaning of the Musgrave Federal Marriage Amendment 3 (May 13, 2004)
[hereinafter Musgrave Memorandum], reprinted in Federal Marriage Amendment (The
Musgrave Amendment): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 12 (2004) [hereinafter May 13, 2004 Hearing]; see
also May 13, 2004 Hearing, supra, at 18 (statement of Judge Robert H. Bork).
66. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Times vs. Sullivan, Nat’l Rev. Online, Feb. 9, 2004, at http:/
/www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru200402091407.asp (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
67. February Volokh Posting, supra note 64.
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‘incidents of marriage’ as something that even unmarried couples may
possess—and when that happens, the right or behavior does not ‘cease[ ]
to be an incident of marriage’; it remains an incident of marriage,
though one that unmarried couples possess together with married
ones.”68
Thus, by the time the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee
on the Constitution held the first of many congressional hearings on the
FMA on September 4, 2003,69 there was considerable public disagreement among legal commentators as to what, exactly, the FMA would accomplish. At that first congressional hearing, law professor Dale
Carpenter made the committee aware of the concern that, when it is read
in the very reasonable manner suggested by Professor Volokh, the second
sentence of the FMA “might even prevent State courts from enforcing
domestic partnerships or civil unions.”70
That very same day, another law professor, Charles Rice, a proponent of amending the Constitution to ban both gay marriage and civil
unions, published an op-ed arguing that the FMA was unacceptably vague
and needed to be rewritten. Rice explained that, “[s]ome of its principal
backers, including . . . Bork . . . apparently think the FMA would allow a
legislature to approve Vermont-style, same-sex ‘civil unions’ . . . . Other
proponents of FMA believe it would forbid a legislature to approve such
‘civil unions.’ The FMA, unfortunately, is so unclear that either position
is fairly arguable.”71
Professor Rice made a compelling argument for more clarity, but
what he apparently did not take into account was that this ambiguity may
well have been intentional. When Judge Bork and Professors George and
Bradley were drafting the Amendment, they were hoping to satisfy a number of different constituencies within the broad conservative tent.72
There may have been widespread agreement among conservatives that
there was a need for an anti-gay-marriage amendment, but there was
profound disagreement on its proper scope and reach. According to
Professor George: “some people wanted to ban all civil unions”; “some
people wanted a pure federalism amendment,” leaving the issue of civil
unions to the states, and guaranteeing that no state would be forced to
recognize civil unions entered into in other states; and “some wanted a
pure judicial restraint amendment,” precluding state and federal judges
68. Id.
69. See What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2003).
70. Id. at 21 (statement of Dale Carpenter, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School); see also id. at 34.
71. Charles E. Rice, Reformulate the Federal Marriage Amendment,
HumanEvents.com, Sept. 4, 2003, at http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=1724
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
72. See Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
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from mandating civil unions, but not tying the hands of legislators.73
Those goals were, of course, mutually exclusive; to appease those who
wanted to ban civil unions would be to defy those who wanted to preserve
legislative flexibility, and vice versa. The only way to satisfy all of those
constituencies simultaneously was to pen an amendment that was ambiguous enough that it could plausibly be read to support each position.
And that is just what the drafters did. The FMA’s vague language
allowed it to be all things to everyone, such that the disparate factions
could unite around its indeterminate text. The “social conservatives
could not,” the National Review reported, “agree on what the language
meant.”74 And that is precisely why they were able to coalesce around it.
It was simultaneously acceptable to Judge Bork, who favored leaving the
question of civil unions to the state legislatures, and to Professors George
and Bradley, who did not. It was being promoted to a moderate public by
the Alliance for Marriage as leaving the civil unions issue to the states,
while at the same time, Professor George was privately reassuring leaders
of the social conservative movement that it would do just the opposite.75
If the drafters did intend to avoid conflict by phrasing the
Amendment in this way, their plan was at least partially unsuccessful. Initially, the Amendment did not prove to be all things to absolutely everyone in the conservative movement. A small number of social conservative
groups that favored banning all gay unions, not just gay marriages, interpreted the FMA to go against their wishes by allowing legislatively created
civil unions, and publicly opposed it for that reason.76 As Michael Farris,
chairman of the Home School Legal Defense Association, put it: “I don’t
care if you call it civil unions. I don’t care if you call it domestic partnership, I don’t care if you call it cantaloupe soup, if you are legally spouses
at the end of the day, I am not willing to do that.”77 These groups insisted on changing the language of the Amendment to make crystal clear
that it would prohibit civil unions. At the same time, other conservatives
(including the White House and Senator Hatch) who favored leaving the
civil unions question to the state legislatures, took the opposite approach.
They too were unhappy with the ambiguous text and they privately urged
the Amendment’s sponsors to change the language to make the opposite
crystal clear: that the Amendment would not prohibit civil unions.78 In
the words of one observer, “[c]onservative activists were pulling the
73. Id.
74. Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39, at 32.
75. See Interview by Editors of Human Events with Sandy Rios, President, Concerned
Women of America (Jan. 14, 2004), in Sandy Rios: Banning Gay Marriage Tops CWA
Agenda, Human Events, Jan. 26, 2004, at 24.
76. See Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32; Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39,
at 32.
77. David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Using Issue of Gay Unions as a Rallying Tool,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Rallying Tool].
78. See Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39, at 32.
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amendment right while the Republican establishment was pulling it left.
It looked as though the amendment would fall apart.”79
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
issued its decision in the Goodridge case, mandating full marriage rights
for gays and lesbians.80 That decision spurred the Congress into action.
Something needed to be done to get over the impasse among conservatives. Republican congressional leaders met the very next day to discuss
the language of the FMA in anticipation of formally introducing it in the
Senate.81 They were undoubtedly aware at that meeting of the profound
ambiguity in the language of the Amendment. That ambiguity had already been pointed out to them at a hearing, and it had been the focus of
a spirited debate among conservatives. And yet, just days later, the FMA
was introduced in the Senate by Senator Wayne Allard with language
identical to the House bill.82 The impasse had been overcome in the
only manner that it could have been: by embracing, rather than eliminating, the ambiguity.
The decision to stick with the Alliance for Marriage’s text was a deliberate one, made after a heated meeting between congressional leaders
and the Arlington Group,83 an association of the nation’s most influential
social conservative organizations that had proposed revisions to the FMA
designed to make clear it would ban Vermont-style civil unions.84 As
Glenn Stanton of Focus on the Family explained, the issue at the meeting
was “‘purity versus pragmatism . . . . Do we go for everything that we want,
or take the best we think we can get?’”85 A few social conservative groups
came down on the side of purity, insisting “that it would be pointless to
fight for an amendment that allowed gay marriage in all but name. The
amendment had to ‘protect an institution, not a word.’”86 But after the
congressional leaders made a compelling case that the votes would never
be there for the Arlington Group’s rephrased amendment, the Reverend
Donald Wildmon, the founder of the American Family Association and
the man who had originally convened the Arlington Group, explained
that “‘reality set in’” among those attending the meeting, and a reluctant
near-consensus emerged in favor of pragmatism over principles.87
Yet the allegedly pragmatic FMA did not clearly permit civil unions;
the textual ambiguity that had led a number of legal experts to conclude
that the Amendment would actually preclude civil unions remained. On
November 29, 2003, Matt Daniels, the president of the Alliance for
79. Id.
80. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968–69 (Mass. 2003).
81. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29.
82. See S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
83. See Seelye, supra note 81.
84. See Kirkpatrick, Rallying Tool, supra note 77.
85. Cooperman, Opponents, supra note 50.
86. Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39, at 32.
87. Kirkpatrick, Rallying Tool, supra note 77.
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Marriage (the group that had initially proposed and remained the leading proponent of the Amendment) publicly admitted the existence of the
ambiguity, and explained that his group was working on “minor changes
in the text to make it explicit and undeniably clear that we are not seeking to invalidate legislatively created civil unions.”88 Over the next several
months, however, as the Amendment continued to gather supporters and
continued to make its way through the legislative process, those changes
did not come.
In the meantime, the public debate among columnists and internet
bloggers about the probable effect of the FMA on the institution of the
civil union continued.89 Although many of the Amendment’s advocates
repeated the claim that it would leave the issue of civil unions to the state
legislatures,90 the ACLU and other groups continued to insist that the
Amendment would have dire consequences for civil unions.91 Op-eds
were written questioning the FMA’s sponsors’ reading of the text.92 Major news outlets, including the New York Times,93 the Washington Post,94 the

88. Cooperman, Opponents, supra note 50.
89. Some authors joined Professor Volokh and Andrew Sullivan in questioning the
promises of the Amendment’s sponsors. See, e.g., Posting of Jacob Levy to The Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2004_02_15_volokh_archive.html (Feb. 19, 2004, 8:06
EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Posting of Walter Olson to Overlawyered,
http://www.overlawyered.com/archives/000834.html (Feb. 20, 2004, 12:05 EST) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Others joined Ramesh Ponnuru in defending the
interpretation insisted upon by the Amendment’s sponsors. See, e.g., Posting of Justin
Katz to Dust in the Light, http://dustinthelight.timshelarts.com/lint/2004_02.html (Feb.
18, 2004, 15:35 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Posting of Anthony Rickey to
Three Years of Hell, http://www.threeyearsofhell.com/archive/000480.php (Feb. 11,
2004, 3:05 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
90. See, e.g., David Limbaugh, Time for a Federal Marriage Amendment,
Newsmax.com, Jan. 16, 2004, at http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/ 2004/1/
16/02331.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
91. See, e.g., ACLU, Frequently Asked Questions About the Federal Marriage
Amendment and Gay Marriage, Feb. 25, 2004, at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/ gen/
11931res20040225.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Pride at Work, Federal
Marriage Amendment Q & A, at http://www.prideatwork.org/page.php?id=258 (last
visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
92. See, e.g., E. Thomas McClanahan, Op-Ed., States Not Judges, Should Decide the
Fate of Marriage, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Feb. 26, 2004, at 19A (noting that FMA’s text is
“thoroughly muddled on the subject of civil unions,” to point of being “linguistic goo,” and
arguing that, while “[s]ome supporters say the amendment would permit civil unions . . . I
don’t see it in the words”); Eric Shumsky, Op-Ed., The Amendment Speaks for Itself, Wash.
Post, Feb. 29, 2004, at B5 (finding that contrary to proponents’ interpretation, “the
language in the Musgrave amendment would render civil unions . . . meaningless”).
93. See Editorial, Putting Bias in the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2004, at A22
(arguing that language of Amendment could “be used to deny gay couples even economic
benefits”).
94. See Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32 (reporting “no consensus—even
among its authors—about what the text means”).
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Economist,95 and the National Review 96 —among many others—reported
on the textual ambiguity and the widespread disagreement regarding the
effect of the Amendment on civil unions.97
The Senate Judiciary Committee held another subcommittee hearing on the topic, at which several Senators explained that, on their reading of the text, the Amendment would preclude state legislatures from
enacting enforceable civil union laws.98 Senator Kennedy, in particular,
spoke forcefully: “Advocates of the amendment claim that it addresses
only gay marriage and will not prevent States from granting the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples through civil laws. But that is not
what the text of the amendment says.”99 Rather, because it “forbids samesex couples from receiving the legal incidents of marriage,” it “would prohibit State courts from enforcing . . . laws that deal with civil unions.”100
Several witnesses and advocacy groups expressed their agreement with
that reading at the hearing,101 and even one of the leading public advocates of amending the Constitution, Maggie Gallagher, acknowledged the
possibility that the wording of the proposed Amendment might not be
consistent with the expressed intentions of its sponsors.102 And yet, the
Alliance for Marriage and the Amendment’s congressional sponsors continued to push the ambiguous text.
Many opponents of the FMA were inclined to ascribe nefarious purposes to the failure to clear up the potentially misleading text. As the
Washington Post reported, “[g]ay rights groups contend that the phrase
95. See New Fuel for the Culture Wars, Economist, Feb. 28, 2004, at 29, 29–30 (noting
argument of FMA supporters that it “would stop only marriage among homosexuals, not
civil unions” and argument of FMA opponents that “proponents of a constitutional ban are
just plain wrong—or lying—when they say their amendment would permit civil unions”).
96. See Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39, at 33 (describing controversy about meaning
of Amendment).
97. The media had previously been inclined to accept uncritically the FMA’s
sponsors’ characterization of its effects on civil unions. But complaints from watchdog
organizations like Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting led most media outlets to begin, in
February 2004, to acknowledge the uncertain scope of the Amendment. See Peter Hart,
Activism Shifts Coverage of Proposed Gay-Marriage Amendment, Extra!, Mar./Apr. 2004,
available at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1171 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
98. See, e.g., Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What Are the National Implications of
the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage
Laws?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 168 (2004) [hereinafter March 3, 2004
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (“Such language would almost certainly take away the rights of States to create
domestic partnerships or civil unions.”).
99. Id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Member, Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights).
100. Id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
101. See, e.g., id. at 62 (press release of ACLU); id. at 162–63 (letter from Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights); id. at 222–24 (statement of NAACP).
102. See id. at 35–36 (statement of Maggie Gallagher, President, Institute for
Marriage and Public Policy).

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-3\COL301.txt

unknown

Seq: 21

25-MAR-08

2008] FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND ORIGINALISM

12:26

549

about ‘legal incidents’ of marriage would bar civil unions, and that evangelical Christian organizations are trying to sell the amendment to the
public as more moderate than it is.”103 On his blog, law professor Jack
Balkin suggested that the text was a game of “bait and switch,” “cleverly
and confusingly written” to make Vermont-style civil union laws unenforceable, while appearing at first glance to leave the matter of civil unions to the states.104 That charge was repeated by numerous others, including Senator Kennedy, who accused the FMA’s supporters of
attempting to “confuse and deceive the American people about . . . what
their proposed amendment will do,”105 and gay rights advocate Evan
Wolfson, who accused the Amendment’s supporters of “being deliberately deceptive,” and insisted that, notwithstanding the moderate-sounding promises of the Amendment’s backers, its “vague and sweeping language” was “intended to deny any . . . measure of protection, including
civil unions.”106 Similarly, Andrew Sullivan asserted that the
Amendment’s backers were deliberately “lying about their amendment”107 and had planted the second sentence as a “stealth bomb” to
surreptitiously eliminate civil unions.108
The critics may have been right that the FMA’s sponsors and proponents were intentionally deceiving the American people. But one need
not ascribe fraudulent motives in order to explain their failure to clear up
the ambiguity in their text. The sponsors may indeed have believed that
their Amendment allowed the states to create civil unions, and they may,
personally, have been perfectly willing to amend the text in order to
make that proposition more clear. But their hands were likely tied by
103. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
104. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003/11/isfederal-marriage-amendment-bait-and.html (Nov. 21, 2003, 14:34 EST) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Balkin, Balkinization].
105. March 3, 2004 Hearing, supra note 98, at 42 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
106. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Plans to Back Marriage Amendment,
Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 2004, at A1.
107. Posting of Andrew Sullivan to andrewsullivan.com, http://time-blog.com/daily_
dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_02_01_dish_archive.html&PHPSESSID=6295a59f
99f10f156f495c772e646208 (Feb. 8, 2004, 23:06 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
108. Posting of Andrew Sullivan to andrewsullivan.com, http://time-blog.com/daily_
dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_02_01_dish_archive.html&PHPSESSID=6295a59f
99f10f156f495c772e646208 (Feb. 11, 2004, 12:31 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). This view was endorsed by a great many other internet posters and commenters.
See, e.g., Comment of Joe D. to Three Years of Hell, http://www.threeyearsofhell.com/
archive/000480.php (Feb. 11, 2004, 9:56 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing that only possible explanation for sponsors’ failure to change text of Amendment
was that they were attempting to preserve support of those who wanted to ban civil unions
and believed that current wording would accomplish that task); Comment of Toluca Jim/
Visible Hand to Three Years of Hell, http://www.threeyearsofhell.com/archive/000480.
php (Feb. 11, 2004 12:16 EST) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that
ambiguous text was intentionally drafted to appear to be compromise, while in fact having
extreme effect).
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their need to hold together their tenuous coalition. Making clear that
the Amendment bars the states from adopting civil unions would have
alienated moderates and made it politically impossible for the President
and many in Congress to support it; it would have been dead on arrival.
But at the same time, making clear that the Amendment allows the states
to adopt civil unions would have made it extremely hard to drum up
grassroots support among the social conservative movement; it would
have caused a massive exodus of support from the religious right.109
With the ambiguity remaining in place, social conservative groups like the
Family Research Council (which had publicly refused to compromise on
the civil unions issue and had adamantly resisted the Alliance For
Marriage’s suggestions to liberalize the language to make clear that it allowed civil unions) were able to aggressively back the Amendment, sending out blanket email messages to build support.110
At the very least, the ambiguity made it easier for these groups to
avoid mention of civil unions in their advocacy, thus averting confrontation with their more purist, less pragmatic members.111
The Traditional Values Coalition’s Andrea Lafferty—a staunch opponent of civil unions—lamented this fact:
[T]hey neglected to inform our own people that this amendment ducks on civil unions . . . . This has caused a “fog of war” to
descend on this debate with few of the rank-and-file grass-roots
activists across America understanding that this marriage
amendment . . . symbolically reasserts the traditional definition
of marriage but substantially leaves it open to distortion by civil
union[s] . . . .112
Indeed, if the allegations of one ideologically pure religious conservative website are to be believed, the ambiguity was consciously exploited by the social conservative advocacy groups to actively mislead
their members into supporting a compromise amendment that the faithful would otherwise not have accepted: “Instead of warning their members that this wording actually allowed gay civil unions, these organizations boldly lied, stating that this amendment was needed in order to
109. Indeed, many conservative groups feared that the failure to make the opposite
change—to amend the text to explicitly ban civil unions—would on its own make it
difficult to drum up grass roots evangelical support. See Cooperman, Opponents, supra
note 50.
110. See Keith Perine & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Parties Wary of Political Risk in Stands on
Gay Marriage, 62 Cong. Q. Wkly. 84, 91 (2004).
111. See Louis P. Sheldon, TVC Opposed to Marriage Protection Amendment,
Traditional Values Coalition, June 1, 2006, at http://traditionalvalues.org/modules.php?
sid=2742 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Amendment’s supporters
have “artfully avoided” any discussion of civil unions).
112. Andrea Lafferty, Should Congress Ban Gay Marriages and Civil Unions? YES,
OregonLive.com, July 13, 2004, at http://www.oregonlive.com/special/gaymarriage/
index.ssf?/special/oregonian/gaymarriage/040713_yes.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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prevent gay civil unions! No one from Focus On The Family ever told
their members the truth!”113
In other words, the ambiguity at the very least made it possible for
those conservative groups that were willing to compromise to drum up
support among their less-compromise-inclined membership without having to answer for their impurity.114 But of course, the ambiguity also had
the potential to do more than that. It may also have given these groups
hope that they could yet prevail on the civil unions issue in the courts,
notwithstanding the unhelpful rhetoric from the Amendment’s sponsors.
Publicly airing those thoughts was impossible, as it would have alienated
the moderates and destroyed the coalition. But privately, those groups
had every reason to remain optimistic that, at the end of the day, the
“compromise” would end up being no compromise at all.
It was on February 24, 2004, in the midst of this public confusion
(and perhaps deception), that President Bush announced his support for
the FMA.115 For months, Bush had resisted aggressive courting from the
FMA’s backers, in part because he feared being labeled as intolerant or
bigoted.116 The FMA had put Bush in a political bind at the outset of his
reelection campaign. Pollsters and strategists warned the President that
publicly supporting a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage
would make him appear intolerant, which could cost him much-needed
support among swing voters, “soccer moms” and other moderate
Republicans, and the approximately one million gay Republican voters
who had supported him in the 2000 election117 (when he had declared
that gay marriage was an issue for the states to resolve118). But at the
same time, Karl Rove, Bush’s most trusted political advisor, warned him
that the failure of millions of evangelical voters to turn out at the ballot
box had nearly cost him the election in 2000, and impressed upon him
the need to please his conservative Christian base in order to win reelec113. National Disaster!! Congress Changes Language of Federal Marriage
Amendment to Allow Gay “Civil Unions”!, The Cutting Edge, at http://www.cuttingedge.
org/NEWS/n1905.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter National Disaster]. These remarks, and those of Andrea Lafferty, quoted
above, were actually made after the language of the FMA was revised. See infra Part I.B.
114. Louis Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition later lamented, “If there was a
‘truth in labeling’ requirement for political groups, AFM would be forced to change its
name to Alliance for Marriage and Civil Unions.” Traditional Values Coalition, Alliance
for Marriage Also Supports Homosexual Civil Unions, Mar. 6, 2007, at http://www.
traditionalvalues.org/print.php?sid=3025 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. See Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay
Marriage: President Says States Could Rule on Civil Unions, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2004, at
A1 [hereinafter Allen & Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment].
116. See Kirkpatrick, Rallying Tool, supra note 77.
117. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush’s Push for Marriage Falls Short for Conservatives,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2004, at A18 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Bush’s Push].
118. See Marriage Amendment: Will It Help or Hurt Bush?, CNN.com, Feb. 26, 2004,
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/25/elec04.prez.bush.marriage/ (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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tion.119 Christian conservative leaders insisted that the President support
the FMA. Gary Bauer of American Values warned, “If the White House
puts this on the back burner or doesn’t put political capital into it, that
would deeply demoralize a large block of voters that they are expecting to
turn out in November.”120
The President thus found himself in something of a catch-22. To
win reelection, he needed the support of both social conservatives and
Republican moderates. And yet, on this fundamental issue, those two
groups were far apart. The conservatives were demanding his support for
banning not only gay marriage, but also civil unions.121 Many moderates,
on the other hand, were somewhat put off by the idea of amending the
Constitution to ban gay marriage, and they perceived a ban on civil unions
as downright discriminatory and mean-spirited.122
In the end, the President was saved by the FMA’s unclear wording.
The textual ambiguity allowed him to appear moderate by publicly supporting the right of states to create civil unions (the compromise position
endorsed by the political center), while not alienating his socially conservative base, at least some of whom may have been satisfied by behindthe-scenes assurances that the Amendment would in fact end up banning
all civil unions, despite the contrary rhetoric from its sponsors.123
To be sure, some social conservatives were not satisfied. Concerned
Women for America, for instance, issued a statement shortly after
President Bush’s announcement saying that it “cannot support the defective remedy he has chosen” because it could allow the states to create civil
unions.124 But most of the President’s social conservative base was willing
to go along. The Baptist Press reported that, “[f]or the most part, pro119. See Kirkpatrick, Bush’s Push, supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Franklin Foer, Marriage Counselor, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1, 2004, at
39, 40 (noting anger among social conservative leaders over Alliance for Marriage’s
support for amendment that would ostensibly allow states to create civil unions).
122. See Kirkpatrick, Bush’s Push, supra note 117.
123. Thus, for instance, Louis Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition observed
that, given the political sensitivity of the issue, he did not mind that President Bush, when
endorsing the Amendment, also indicated support for allowing state legislatures to create
civil unions (though Sheldon himself would settle for nothing less than an amendment
banning all civil unions). “The whole point here is to be generic on the issue [in public
comments] but specific in the wording” of the Amendment, said Sheldon. Seelye, supra
note 81. Sheldon publicly supported the original version of the FMA and pledged to rally
his organization’s members in its support. See Michael Foust, Top Leaders Thank Bush
for Marriage Amendment Stance, Baptist Press, Feb. 25, 2004, at http://www.bpnews.net/
bpnews.asp?id=17721 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); People for the American Way,
National Coalition Promotes Federal Heterosexual Marriage Amendment, at http://
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=4156 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Sheldon declared that “TVC will do whatever it
can to help the Alliance for Marriage secure passage of The Federal Marriage
Amendment”). Yet he adamantly opposed amending the Constitution in a way that would
permit civil unions. See Sheldon, supra note 111.
124. Allen & Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment, supra note 115.
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family organizations seem unified”; indeed, seventy leaders of major social conservative organizations “issued a statement, praising Bush . . . and
pledging their support.”125
B. The Revised Federal Marriage Amendment
Unfortunately for the FMA’s sponsors, as much as they might have
liked to leave the ambiguous wording of the second sentence unaltered,
that option ultimately proved unacceptable to the moderates in their coalition. The fact that the second sentence was naturally read to preclude
state legislatures from creating civil unions as an alternative to gay marriage apparently made it impossible for the Amendment to garner
enough votes in the Senate.126 Thus, literally on the eve of a March 23,
2004, hearing on the Amendment in the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senator Allard was forced to introduce a revised version providing:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other
than the union of a man and a woman.127
The first sentence remained unchanged between the two drafts of
the Amendment, but the words “nor state or federal law” had been excised from the second sentence.
Senator Allard explained his reasons for the change: “[A]fter hearing . . . comments from my colleagues and working with constitutional
scholars, the decision was made that we would change the words so that it
met the goals which I publicly talked about,” namely, that it would allow
state legislatures to create civil unions.128 Senator Allard described his
revisions as “technical in nature” and designed simply “to clarify and remove any ambiguity.”129 “Numerous critics have propounded the false
notion that we have far greater restrictions in mind, and it is my hope
that our technical changes will serve to clear the air of this charge.”130
125. Michael Foust, Should a Marriage Amendment Also Ban Civil Unions?, Baptist
Press, Dec. 5, 2003, at http://www.baptistpress.com/bpnews.asp?id=17217 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The Amendment’s liberal opponents were not placated by
President Bush’s assurances about civil unions, and some of them promptly added the
President to their list of persons who were intentionally lying about the Amendment’s
effects. See, e.g., Marriage Equality, at http://www.wall-eye.com/marriageequality.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The President knows
that civil unions are not allowed in the language of the [FMA]. . . . The American people
are deliberately being misled.” (emphasis omitted)).
126. See Carl Hulse, Backers Revise Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23,
2004, at A21.
127. S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004).
128. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) [hereinafter March
23, 2004 Hearing] (statement of Sen. Wayne Allard).
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 11.
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On the basis of their quick, initial read, many of the blindsided
Democratic Senators and committee witnesses seemed to agree that the
revised language had cleared up the primary ambiguity in the earlier
draft—that it was now clear that the Amendment would allow state legislatures to create civil unions.131 By removing the words “nor state or federal law,” the revision seemed to eliminate the concern that the
Amendment would preclude a court from construing a state law to allow
civil unions, even if that was the clear mandate of the legislation. On his
blog, Professor Volokh—who had been one of the first critics to raise that
concern—immediately agreed, declaring that the revised Amendment
“clearly lets state voters and legislatures enact civil unions by statute.”132
The Bush Administration also quickly endorsed that reading.133
But others were unsure that the ambiguity had been successfully excised. Appearing on behalf of the American Bar Association, Phyllis
Bossin testified more cautiously that, due to the removal of the words
“nor state or federal law,” it “would appear that a state legislature could
pass a law permitting civil unions . . . . However, the drafting is silent on
this question and leaves open the possibility that a state would be prohibited from passing such a law.”134 Thus, said Bossin, even with the change,
“the amendment is so ambiguously worded that it is not at all clear
whether it would prohibit statutory civil unions.”135
Over the next several months, however, a general consensus began
to emerge that the revised second sentence would not forbid state legisla131. See, e.g., id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary); id. at 26 (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary); id. at 45, 65 (statement of Professor Teresa Collett, Professor, St. Thomas
School of Law); id. at 45, 73 (statement of Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht, Jules F. and
Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State University).
132. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
archives/archive_2004_03_21-2004_03_27.shtml (Mar. 22, 2004, 10:31 EST) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
133. See Federal Marriage Amendment Proponents Offer Compromise, Fox News,
Mar. 22, 2004, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,114898,00.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
134. March 23, 2004 Hearing, supra note 128, at 58–59 (statement of Phyllis G.
Bossin, Chair, Section on Family Law, American Bar Association).
135. Id. at 59. In addition, there was a great deal of confusion at the hearing about
whether the revised text would allow a state to create civil unions by constitutional
amendment, rather than by ordinary statute. After all, the revision may have removed the
ban on construing state “law” to require that the benefits of marriage be extended to gays
and lesbians, but in its revised form the Amendment still declared that “the constitution of
any State” shall not “be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.” Some Senators
and witnesses at the hearing insisted that states would be allowed to enact such
constitutional amendments, see, e.g., id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Allard), while others
found the text ambiguous on this point, see, e.g., id. at 46 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein,
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago),
and still others insisted that the states would not be able to do so, see, e.g., id. at 28–29
(statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). This
uncertainty persisted throughout the entire life of the FMA.
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tures from creating civil unions by statute.136 For the few social conservative groups that had already opposed the FMA for not going far enough
to prevent civil unions, the textual clarification only served to illuminate
the need to reject the Amendment. Concerned Women for America, for
instance, issued a press statement declaring: “At least this clarifies
whether the amendment is worded specifically to allow state legislatures
to create counterfeit ‘marriage.’”137 But the vast majority of social conservative groups maintained their support, even those groups like the
Family Research Council that had been vehemently adverse to compromise and had aggressively insisted from the very beginning on an amendment that would bar civil unions.
Why would a social conservative organization that refuses to compromise and insists on an amendment that bars both gay marriage and civil
unions be willing to go along with a revision to the second sentence that
makes clear that that sentence does not prohibit legislatively created civil
unions? The answer may lie in the fact that Senator Allard and the
Alliance for Marriage had done nothing to change the Amendment’s first
sentence. Recall that two of the three authors of the FMA understood
the first sentence to prohibit legislatively created civil unions, even without the aid of the second sentence.138 The fact that the second sentence is
best read not to preclude state legislatures from passing civil union laws is
irrelevant if the first sentence is best read to affirmatively prohibit state legislatures from doing so. The year-long, high-profile debate over the disputed meaning of the second sentence, culminating in the decision to
alter its text and the subsequent debate over the meaning of the revised
text, had served to distract attention from the unsettled meaning of the
first sentence. Yet that uncertainty persisted, even if it had, to this point,
largely avoided public scrutiny.
As gay rights advocates began to focus on the meaning of the first
sentence, they became disillusioned with what they saw. David Remes, an
attorney with the Washington, D.C., law firm of Covington & Burling,
136. Thus, for example, law review articles published during this period reported that
any previous ambiguity on the question of legislatively created civil unions had been
eliminated. See, e.g., Glidden, supra note 58, at 484–85.
137. Press Release, Concerned Women for Am., CWA Calls for Real Protection of
Marriage (Mar. 22, 2004), at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=5396&department
=MEDIA&categoryid=family (on file with the Columbia Law Review). There were reports
that the leaders of those few conservative groups that did speak out against the amended
FMA were forced out of office by James Dobson of Focus on the Family, an extremely
powerful figure in the social conservative movement. See J. Edward Pawlick, Sandy Rios of
CWA Removed by James Dobson, Mass. News, Mar. 17, 2004, at http://www.massnews.
com/2004_editions/03_march/031704_dobson_replaces_rios.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). While some social conservatives saw these allegations as evidence
that Dobson is actually less conservative and righteous than he claims to be, see National
Disaster, supra note 113, it is of course possible that Dobson was fighting hard to silence
opposition to the FMA from the right because he believed that the FMA would have a
more draconian impact in practice than its supporters were able to publicly admit.
138. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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prepared and circulated on behalf of “a broad coalition of civil rights,
religious, legal, and professional organizations” a memorandum analyzing the meaning of the revised FMA. In that memorandum—often referred to in the public debate as the “Covington Memorandum”—Remes
opined that “[l]egislation extending to same-sex couples the ‘legal incidents’ of marriage under the second sentence of the FMA would inevitably be attacked as an end-run around the prohibition of same-sex marriage in the first sentence of the FMA.”139 As Remes explained, the
“argument would be that if the first sentence of the FMA is to have any
real meaning, it cannot be read simply to bar the use of ‘marriage’ as a
label but must be read to bar same-sex unions that are ‘marriages’ in
substance.”140
At a House Judiciary Committee hearing on May 13, 2004,
Representative Musgrave introduced a memorandum on the meaning of
the FMA prepared by her office. In that memorandum, Musgrave offered
a conclusory rejection of the conclusions of the Covington
Memorandum: “[T]he FMA is not intended to prevent the legislatures of
the various states from enacting . . . a law similar to the Vermont civil
union law that is intended to give partners in a relationship all of the
benefits of marriage save the single exception of calling their relationship
a ‘marriage.’”141 Rather, “[t]he sponsor intends that the first sentence of
the FMA should apply exclusively to legally-recognized relationships that
are called ‘marriage’ under the law of a state.”142 Musgrave insisted that
her Amendment sought only to protect the important symbolism of the
word “marriage,”143 a claim echoed at the hearing by Judge Bork.144
The conservative group Liberty Counsel also published a long memorandum purporting to respond to the Covington Memorandum. That
memorandum insisted that “the FMA does not prohibit the legislature
from extending legal protection or benefits to same-sex couples,”145 but
it conspicuously did not explicitly opine on whether the first sentence
would preclude a Vermont-style civil union, and it did not attempt to rebut the main thrust of the Covington Memorandum’s argument that the
139. Memorandum from David H. Remes, Partner, Covington & Burling, The
Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment Repudiates Fundamental Constitutional
Principles and Would Embroil Federal and State Courts in Endless Litigation 2 (May 12,
2004), available at www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_342.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
140. Id.
141. Musgrave Memorandum, supra note 65, at 10–11.
142. Id. at 11.
143. May 13, 2004 Hearing, supra note 65, at 105 (statement of Rep. Marilyn
Musgrave).
144. See id. at 109 (statement of Judge Bork).
145. Memorandum from Mathew D. Staver et al., Liberty Counsel, The Federal
Marriage Amendment Preserves Marriage as the Union of One Man and One Woman and
Is Consistent with Constitutional Jurisprudence and Federalism 7 (July 10, 2004), available
at http://www.lc.org/marriage/fma_memo_senate_071004.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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first sentence would likely be read to protect more than just a label.146
Indeed, Liberty Counsel was at the same time arguing to the California
courts that a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage forecloses
the legislature from enacting domestic partnership laws.147
Despite the profound ambiguity that remained in the first sentence
and that had now come to public light, Senate leaders worked to schedule a floor vote on the FMA prior to the 2004 elections, so as to force
Democrats, particularly Senators Kerry and Edwards, the Democratic
Party’s presidential ticket, to go on record on this divisive issue.148 Senate
Democrats were furious that the Amendment was being rushed to the
floor without first receiving a vote in the Judiciary Committee, and without the benefit of a committee report explaining the meaning of the proposed text. Senator Leahy lamented that an unfortunate byproduct of
the strategic decision to bypass committee consideration for political gain
was that the full Senate was being forced to consider an unacceptably
ambiguous amendment. Noting that “[c]ommittee consideration can
also ensure that we agree on what an amendment does, even if we disagree on whether what it does is desirable,” Senator Leahy introduced into
the congressional record a newspaper article from the Washington Post
explaining how even the Amendment’s own authors could not agree
about what it means.149 All of the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary
Committee wrote a joint letter to Chairman Hatch urging him to delay
the debate and vote on the ground that, “while the language of the FMA
has recently been modified, there is still significant doubt as to its intent
and effect.”150
Nonetheless, Republican leaders brought the FMA to the Senate
floor, where it was debated by the full Senate from July 9 to July 14, 2004.
Throughout that debate, the Amendment’s supporters repeatedly and
confidently insisted that it would not interfere with the ability of the state
legislatures to create civil unions by statute. Typical of these statements
was the decree by Senator Allard, the Amendment’s principal sponsor,
that “the amendment does not seek to prohibit in any way the lawful,
democratic creation of civil unions.”151 But in the same breath, Senator
Allard characterized the creation of civil unions in Vermont as “the first
146. See also, e.g., William C. Duncan, Survey of Interstate Recognition of QuasiMarital Statuses, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 617, 634 (2005) (declaring that it “is not a plausible
reading” of second sentence that it would bar legislatively created civil unions, but ignoring
possibility that first sentence might do so).
147. See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
148. See Klarman, supra note 58, at 465.
149. 150 Cong. Rec. S8000 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
150. Id. at S7964 (reproducing letter of June 25, 2004).
151. 150 Cong. Rec. S7873 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allard); see also
150 Cong. Rec. S8069 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (letter from Professor Teresa S. Collett)
(arguing that all “fair-minded” FMA opponents had to admit that, as currently worded,
Amendment allowed legislatures to create civil unions); 150 Cong. Rec. S7916 (daily ed.
July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); id. at S7913 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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success” in “the effort to destroy traditional marriage.”152 And he introduced into the record a magazine article arguing that the experience
with state-sponsored same-sex unions in Scandinavia shows that all legally
recognized gay unions are destroying marriage: “Scandinavian registered
partnerships are Vermont-style civil unions. They are not called marriage, yet resemble marriage in almost every other respect. . . . The lesson
of the Scandinavian experience is that even de facto same-sex marriage
undermines marriage.”153
Not surprisingly, then, opponents of the FMA remained unconvinced by claims that its likely effects were clear. Senator Feingold argued
that “[t]here is significant doubt about how this amendment will be interpreted and what effect it will have on a whole variety of state and local
ordinances.”154 In particular, the FMA’s opponents expressed fear that
the “proposed amendment could be construed to challenge already existing civil union . . . laws or to bar future attempts to enact such laws.”155
Senator Durbin, for example, noted that while the language may, at first
blush, “seem[ ] straightforward enough,” in fact “it is uncertain whether
arrangements such as civil unions . . . could exist at all under this first
sentence of the Federal Marriage Amendment.”156
Other opponents of the FMA went even further, opining not that the
Amendment was ambiguous, but rather that it quite clearly would not allow the states to create civil unions, and that the Amendment’s supporters were being dishonest in saying otherwise. Senator Corzine, for instance, decried, “It is unfortunate that a misinformation campaign about
the consequences of this amendment has been waged upon the American
public by organizations that want to play politics at the expense of gay
and lesbian Americans.”157 And Senator Boxer blasted: “Don’t let anyone tell you: I am for this amendment . . . but I support civil unions . . . .
[O]nce this is enshrined in the Constitution, the States will not be able to
confer equal benefits on civil unions . . . .”158
152. 150 Cong. Rec. S7872 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allard).
153. 150 Cong. Rec. S8006–07 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (reprint of Stanley Kurtz, The
End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage
Collapses, Wkly. Standard, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26).
154. Id. at S7964 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
155. Id. at S7965.
156. Id. at S7973 (statement of Sen. Durbin).
157. 150 Cong. Rec. S8079 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Corzine).
158. 150 Cong. Rec. S7956–57 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Boxer). A
number of Democratic Senators also insisted that, even as amended, the FMA’s second
sentence would preclude legislatively created civil unions. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. S8083
(daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Levin). Moderate Republican Senators
apparently expressed the same concerns behind the scenes. See Helen Dewar & Alan
Cooperman, GOP May Revise Marriage Amendment, Wash. Post, July 13, 2004, at A2
(reporting that some Republicans believed Amendment “could be interpreted as either
sanctioning or banning such [civil] unions”); Carolyn Lochhead, GOP Senators in Disarray
over Gay Marriage, S.F. Chron., July 13, 2004, at A1 (noting Republican concern that FMA
wording might ban civil unions). Some gay rights activists also echoed these concerns.
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In response, Senator Allard expressed frustration that the
Amendment’s opponents were resorting to “misrepresentation about
what this amendment is all about and what it does.”159 He explained that
he had “spent considerable time consulting with legal scholars, constitutional scholars, consulting with my colleagues, and working with staff in
the Judiciary Committee” and had satisfied himself that the allegations
about civil unions were simply “ridiculous charges.”160 He noted that the
Judiciary Committee had held many hearings on the Amendment, and
that the language of the first sentence was “very straightforward” and
“carefully thought out.”161 To wit, Senator Allard introduced into the
record a memorandum prepared by eight law professors concluding that
the argument that the FMA would ban civil unions is “based in hypothetical speculation, rather than serious constitutional analysis” and that, in
fact, the FMA is a “simple” amendment “carefully” drafted to ensure “that
questions of marriage-like benefits for unmarried couples are reserved to
legislative processes.”162 Senator Cornyn, another FMA supporter, similarly declared that arguments that the Amendment:
prevents States from enacting civil unions if they should wish to
do so through their elected representatives . . . do not hold
water. But they do not have to work for our opponents on this
issue to say them because that is not the point. The point is, if
you cannot convince them, confuse them. Their aim is to distract the American people . . . .163
If that was indeed the opponents’ aim, then they succeeded in confusing even many Senate Republicans. The Washington Post reported
that, behind closed doors, “[s]ome Republicans argued that proposed
See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. S8085 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (letter from Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Local Officials Board of Directors) (stating that second sentence of amendment
could “preempt[ ] state and local laws” that confer benefits on gay couples); Andrew
Sullivan, Bush on Gay Marriage: Uncivil, New Republic, July 13, 2004, available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/13/opinion/main629390.shtml (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that second sentence of Amendment would make civil
unions and domestic partnerships unenforceable). Their reasoning, however, was
muddled. Though they may not have clearly expressed their thoughts, or even understood
the issue in this light, it makes sense to view their objections to the second sentence (to the
extent that they were not simply disingenuous) as reflecting a concern that that sentence
does not clearly and affirmatively empower state legislatures to create civil unions or
otherwise to bestow the incidents of marriage upon gay couples. The most that can be said
of the confusing second sentence is that, as revised, it no longer precludes state legislatures
from doing so; it takes no position on legislatively created civil unions. As such, it does not
override the first sentence, if that sentence is read to prohibit the state legislatures from
creating civil unions.
159. 150 Cong. Rec. S8016 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allard).
160. Id.
161. 150 Cong. Rec. S7905–06 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allard).
162. 150 Cong. Rec. S8017 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (letter from George W. Dent,
Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
et al., The Meaning of the Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (July 12, 2004)).
163. 150 Cong. Rec. S8063 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
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language on other legal arrangements, such as civil unions, was confusing
and could be interpreted as either sanctioning or banning such unions.”164 Thus, despite a massive grassroots effort by the Family Research
Council and Focus on the Family to lobby potentially undecided Senators
by telephone, and despite two appeals by President Bush, it became clear
that there were not enough votes to send the Amendment to the states
for ratification.165 Scrambling Republican leaders thus sought to engineer a vote on an alternative version of the Amendment that would consist of only the first sentence, leaving out the much-maligned second sentence.166 (Apparently, the Republicans who supported abandoning the
second sentence believed that doing so would somehow remove—or at
least deflect public attention from—the confusion about civil unions, notwithstanding the fact that, in reality, it was the first sentence that
threatened legislatively created civil unions, not the (revised) second one.
Indeed, some conservative groups, like the Traditional Values Coalition
and Concerned Women for America, supported abandoning the second
sentence because they believed that, standing alone, the first sentence
would clearly preclude civil unions.167) But Democrats used procedural
maneuvers to prevent the Republicans from rewriting the text on the fly
at the eleventh hour,168 and the FMA’s opponents ultimately succeeded
in killing the Amendment by prevailing on a procedural vote by a count
of fifty to forty-eight.169
C. The Marriage Protection Amendment
Even before the final vote, however, the Senate Majority Leader
vowed that the upcoming defeat would not be the end of the FMA.170
The day after the Senate vote, leaders of the Arlington Group dubbed the
defeat in the Senate only a minor setback and promised to continue the
battle.171 Prison Fellowship’s Chuck Colson declared, “I look at this as a
10-year fight. This is Day One.”172
Day Two, as it turned out, was not far off. Just two months after the
Senate vote, Representative Musgrave formally introduced the revised
164. Dewar & Cooperman, supra note 158.
165. See id.; Lochhead, supra note 158.
166. See 150 Cong. Rec. S7930 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist).
167. See Robert Knight, Why a Federal Marriage Amendment Is Needed, June 8,
2006, at http://www.cwfa.org/articles/10822/CWA/family/index.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Sheldon, supra note 111.
168. See Lochhead, supra note 158.
169. See 150 Cong. Rec. S8090 (daily ed. July 14, 2004).
170. See Ed Henry & Craig Broffman, Marriage Amendment Expected to Die in the
Senate, CNN.com, July 14, 2004, at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/ 07/
13/same.sex.marriage/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
171. See Alan Cooperman, Christian Groups Say They Won’t Give Up, Wash. Post,
July 15, 2004, at A4.
172. Id.

R
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version of the FMA in the House of Representatives.173 Although the
amendment that she proposed was essentially word-for-word identical to
the revised version of the FMA that had just failed in the Senate,174
Representative Musgrave chose to rechristen her resolution the
“Marriage Protection Amendment.”175 In another attempt to place incumbents on record on this divisive issue in the weeks leading up to the
2004 election, the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives
engineered a floor vote on the Amendment just seven days after it was
introduced, despite the fact that it had received neither a vote nor a
mark-up in the House Judiciary Committee.176
As the House vote approached, the Amendment’s opponents drafted
letters to Congress repeatedly calling attention to the potentially broad
scope of the first sentence. The ACLU, for instance, urged the
Representatives to “consider the full consequences of the amendment,”
especially “the ‘sleeper sentence.’”177 Although most of the public discussion had focused on the second sentence, the ACLU explained that:
the harmful impact of the first sentence is much broader. . . .
What the supporters of the amendment have never told
Congress is that many of their anti-gay organizations have used
similar state definitions of marriage to challenge a wide range of
protections provided by state and local governments to same-sex
couples and their families.178
Similarly, the American Bar Association reiterated its concern that
“the proposed amendment is far too vague to ascertain its full meaning
with certainty,” and in particular that, “despite the claims of the resolution’s authors, it is unclear whether a state would be prohibited from
passing laws permitting civil unions.”179
173. See H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004).
174. The only difference was that, in the first sentence, the House bill used the word
“solely” whereas the Senate bill used the word “only.” Compare id., with S.J. Res. 30, 108th
Cong. (2004).
175. The previous title, “Federal Marriage Amendment,” had called attention to the
Amendment’s Achilles heel among conservatives: the apparent inconsistency between
nationalizing marriage law—an area traditionally within the heart of state sovereignty—
and a commitment to federalism. The new title, “Marriage Protection Amendment,”
played to the Amendment’s primary appeal to conservatives—its purported protection of
the traditional institution of marriage from liberal judicial activism.
176. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7928 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Dingell)
(“There have been no Committee hearings, no time to look at different amendment
proposals, and no opportunity to have the important deliberations that should take place
when amending the Constitution.”).
177. Letter from Laura W. Murphy & Christopher E. Anders, Dir. & Legislative
Counsel, ACLU, to U.S. Senate (July 9, 2004), at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/
12377leg20040709.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
178. Id.
179. Letter from Robert J. Grey, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Members of
Congress (Sept. 20, 2004), reprinted in 150 Cong. Rec. H7459 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004);
see also Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to U.S. House of
Representatives (Sept. 28, 2004), at http://www.civilrights.org/library/advocacy-letters/
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Ignoring these concerns, the House Republican Study Committee’s
Legislative Bulletin insisted that the FMA would leave the decision whether
to allow civil unions up to the legislatures of the individual states.180
Republican supporters of the Amendment repeated that claim on the
House floor during the debate.181
As their Senate counterparts had done, House Democrats accused
the Amendment’s supporters of willfully misrepresenting the effects that
it would have on civil unions. Representative Pelosi, for instance, declared that “proponents have disingenuously claimed that this amendment would not preclude civil unions or domestic partnerships,” even
though “organizations supporting this amendment are now using similarly worded State laws to challenge recognition of domestic partnerships
in several States. And we know these organizations, which the
Republican leadership is beholden to, will not stop there.”182
Representative Nadler similarly charged that “[t]his amendment does
more than it purports to do. . . . [D]o not tell me this is only about marriage. I do not believe it.”183 Throughout the debate, a parade of opponents of the FMA repeated over and over again in no uncertain terms
that the Amendment would have the effect of banning civil unions.184
Even some moderate Republicans opposed the Amendment for this
reason.185
8220marriage-protection-amendment-h-j-res-106.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
180. See Republican Study Comm., Legislative Bulletin 1 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/LB%2009-30-04.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
181. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. H7921 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Kingston) (asserting that “the Marriage Protection Amendment would not prevent any
State from enacting civil union laws”).
182. Id. at H7923 (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
183. Id. at H7900 (statement of Rep. Nadler); see also id. at H7890–91 (statement of
Rep. Frank).
184. See, e.g., id. at H7924 (statement of Rep. Wexler) (“[T]his amendment would
not only ban same-sex marriages but also civil unions . . . .”); id. at H7891 (statement of
Rep. Moran) (“[T]his amendment would usurp the will of the people in States that have
used their traditional States rights authority to define civil marriage and civil union laws.”);
id. at H7889 (statement of Rep. McGovern) (“[I]f this amendment becomes the law of the
land, civil union and domestic partnership laws all across the country will be thrown out
the window.”).
185. See id. at H7909 (statement of Rep. Kolbe) (arguing that FMA “would prohibit”
state legislatures from “enact[ing] provisions for civil unions between two people of the
same sex”); Press Release, Log Cabin Republicans, Log Cabin Republicans Vote to
Withhold Endorsement from President Bush (Sept. 8, 2004), reprinted in 150 Cong. Rec.
H7893–94 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004). Once again, some of the opposition to the
Amendment (from both Democrats and moderate Republicans) appears to have been
based on an interpretation of the second sentence, rather than the first one, as somehow
banning civil unions of its own accord, even after the textual revision. See, e.g., 150 Cong.
Rec. H7929 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Cardin) (“These [governmentconferred benefits of civil unions] . . . could be called into question by this Federal
constitutional amendment if they are considered ‘legal incidents’ of marriage.”); id. at
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At the opposite extreme, at least one conservative Republican,
Representative Hostettler, voted against the Amendment because he believed that it did allow the states to create civil unions: “[The] civil union
law in Vermont [is] unaffected. . . . This Amendment may actually, by
restricting the courts’ ability to grant the incidents of marriage but remaining silent as to the legislatures, provide a constitutional basis for civil
unions. I cannot support this result.”186
Ultimately, the Amendment fell short of the necessary two-thirds
vote, accumulating 227 yeas to 186 nays.187 But even before the final vote
was taken, the Majority Whip promised that the fight to amend the
Constitution had only just begun: “[W]e will be back. We will never give
up. We will protect marriage in this country.”188
D. The Marriage Protection Amendment Redux
The rushed votes in Congress apparently had their intended effect of
helping Republican incumbents and challengers in the 2004 election.189
But the Amendment’s backers were not satisfied with only a political victory. The day after the election, Focus on the Family’s James Dobson
renewed his call for a federal constitutional amendment,190 and a few
days later, Karl Rove responded by promising that the President would
renew his push for the FMA.191 It was no longer good enough to win by
losing. The Republican Party’s social conservative base felt responsible
for the results of the election, and in return for their loyalty, they wanted
to see their top priority—the Federal Marriage Amendment—enacted,
not just voted on. As Mathew Staver, the president of Liberty Counsel,
put it, “[Y]ou’ll see an accelerated effort to move forward with a federal
constitutional amendment because of the marriage and morality mandate the president received in the election.”192
H7925 (statement of Rep. Bono) (“[The Amendment] precludes States from granting
marital status or the ‘legal incidents thereof’ to unmarried couples.”).
186. 150 Cong. Rec. H7926 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
187. See id. at H7933–34.
188. Id. at H7924 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
189. See Klarman, supra note 58, at 465–71 (noting that vulnerable Democrats, like
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who were forced to go on record against FMA were
“almost certainly harmed” in election, and observing that “opposition to same-sex marriage
mobilized conservative Christians to turn out at the polls in 2004 in unprecedented
numbers,” and “also acted as a ‘wedge’ to dislodge traditionally Democratic constituencies
such as African Americans, the elderly, and working-class Catholics,” and thus “may well
have determined the outcome of the presidential election” and “clearly provided the
margin of victory for Republican senators in closely fought contests”).
190. See id. at 471–72.
191. See Gay Marriage, Online NewsHour, Nov. 8, 2004, at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/july-dec04/gaymarriage_11-08.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter NewsHour Debate].
192. Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
2004, at A16.
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Now that the President and congressional leaders felt greater pressure to actually pass the Amendment, rather than simply hold a vote on
it, one might have expected them to clear up the ambiguities that had
emerged during the prior debates. But on January 24, 2005, Senator
Allard reintroduced the Amendment—again under the title “Marriage
Protection Amendment”—in the Senate without changing a word.193 In
doing so, Senator Allard reiterated his mantra that under the Amendment the states “would still be free to determine for themselves civil
union, benefit, and partnership definitions.”194
Some of the Amendment’s liberal opponents apparently believed
that claim.195 Most, however, did not. Immediately, civil rights groups
reiterated their disagreement with Senator Allard’s reading of his
Amendment. The Human Rights Campaign issued a statement claiming
that civil unions would be “endangered” should the Amendment pass,196
and the ACLU issued a press release declaring that the Amendment
would deny states the right to create civil unions.197
Obviously, the confusion had in no way subsided since the last time
that the Amendment had been proposed in Congress. To take just one
example of the lingering public confusion in the period between the
2004 election and the reintroduction of the Amendment at the start of
the following congressional term, PBS hosted a debate on its NewsHour
program between Shannon Royce, Executive Director of the Marriage
Amendment Project, and Matt Foreman, Executive Director of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.198 During that debate, Royce declared that the “amendment as it’s currently drafted . . . leaves the civil
union/domestic partnership benefits questions . . . to the state legislatures,” whereas Foreman countered that “[The Amendment] precludes
more than just marriage. It precludes civil unions. These people will
stop at nothing to try to deprive gay people of their rights.”199
In April 2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
the Constitution held a hearing on the newly reintroduced FMA. At that
hearing, Democratic Senators reminded the Republicans of the fact that,
193. See 151 Cong. Rec. S365–66 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2005).
194. Id. at S365 (statement of Sen. Allard).
195. See, e.g., Joan Shaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the
Sanctity of Marriage or Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 1487, 1517
n.178 (2005) (asserting that, as originally drafted, FMA would have banned civil unions,
but as revised, it would allow state legislatures to create them).
196. Letter from Winnie Stachelberg, Political Dir., Human Rights Campaign, to U.S.
Senators (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://nmmstream.net/hrc/downloads/lobbyday/
HRCMPA109thCongress.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
197. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Criticizes Reintroduction of Federal Marriage
Amendment; Says Measure Has Different Name, Same Discriminatory Goals (Jan. 24,
2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/12431prs20050124.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
198. See NewsHour Debate, supra note 191.
199. Id.
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the last time the Senate considered the Amendment, Senators “had a
hard time agreeing on exactly what it would do,” and they explained that
“[a]mbiguity still remains as to whether the language of the amendment
would permit States to offer . . . civil unions to same-sex couples.”200
The hearing served only to amplify the ambiguity. When the
Republicans called as a witness Professor Gerard Bradley—one of the
original authors of the Amendment—he reiterated his belief that, contrary to what Senator Allard had been saying, the FMA would invalidate
Vermont’s civil union law because that law “is marriage in all but name,”
and thus “is ruled out by the definition of marriage in the first
sentence.”201
Six months later, the Subcommittee on the Constitution held another hearing on the FMA, at which Senator Feingold again expressed
concern that “we still don’t really know . . . whether the language of the
amendment would permit States to offer . . . the option of civil unions.”202 This time, Senator Brownback, the Republican Chairman of the
Subcommittee, apparently agreed: “I hope today we can get from the
witnesses some thoughts on the specific language, because we have held a
number of hearings on a constitutional amendment and we really need
to get down to the wording of this in discussion as we move that on
forward.”203
But the hearing did nothing other than further intensify the confusion. To illustrate his point that “the amendment reflects remarkably
poor lawyering,” Professor Louis Seidman, the Democrats’ legal expert,
explained that a civil union could be viewed as a “marriage,” in which
case “[i]t is unconstitutional under the first sentence of the amendment,”
or it could be treated as granting only the legal incidents of marriage, in
which case “it might well be constitutionally permissible under the second sentence.”204 Professor Seidman explained that “even the drafters of
the amendment are apparently unsure about its effect on these statutes,”
and he queried how a judge could “possibly determine whether or not a

200. Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal and State Defense of Marriage
Initiatives Vulnerable to Judicial Activism?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 3–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Property Rights).
201. Id. at 25 (statement of Professor Gerard V. Bradley, Professor, University of
Notre Dame Law School).
202. An Examination of the Constitutional Amendment on Marriage: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
203. Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Brownback, Chairman, Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights).
204. Id. at 69–70 (statement of Louis Michael Seidman, John Carroll Research
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
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civil union . . . is a ‘marriage in all but name’ when even drafters of [the]
amendment are uncertain as to its meaning.”205
The Republicans called two legal experts to illuminate the issue, but
remarkably, those two experts gave somewhat conflicting answers, both of
which were squarely inconsistent with the preferred interpretation of the
Amendment’s congressional sponsors. The first witness, Professor Richard
Wilkins, insisted that the Amendment reflects “very careful thinking, careful lawyering, and careful wording.”206 Echoing the views of Professor
Robert George—one of the Amendment’s principal drafters—Professor
Wilkins’s testimony appeared to indicate that a civil union law would be
unconstitutional under the FMA, but only if it purported to give the
rights and benefits of marriage to a nonmarital union premised on the
existence of a sexual relationship.207 The other witness, Professor
Christopher Wolfe, testified that any civil union law that granted all of the
benefits of marriage save only the title “marriage” to two unmarried persons—whether it was premised on a sexual relationship or not—would be
unconstitutional.208
At the close of the hearing, Senator Brownback expressed hope that
the profound and deepening uncertainty could be eliminated by a committee markup.209 But just three weeks later, when the Subcommittee on
the Constitution held such a markup, Senator Brownback’s hopes were
dashed. Senator Feingold, the only Senator to make a public statement
at the markup, noted that one “question that is important to many
Senators, and to many Americans, as they consider this constitutional
amendment is how it will apply to laws passed by state or local governments granting same sex couples the right to enter into civil unions.”210
He explained in great detail how the testimony at the hearings made
clear that even the “supporters and drafters of this amendment can’t
agree on how it would affect civil union laws,” and he lamented that
205. Id.
206. Id. at 18 (statement of Richard G. Wilkins, Professor of Law and Managing Dir.,
The World Family Policy Center, Brigham Young University).
207. See id. at 11, 19–20, 22. In subsequent written responses to questions, Professor
Wilkins appeared to contradict his oral testimony when he concluded instead that the FMA
would allow a state legislature to create civil unions conferring all of the benefits of
marriage, save only the word itself, upon a same-sex sexual union. See id. at 33–35.
208. Id. at 42 (statement of Christopher Wolfe, Professor of Political Science,
Marquette University); see also id. at 23, 25–26.
209. See id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Brownback). “A markup is a meeting of the
committee to debate and consider amendments to a measure under consideration. The
markup determines whether the measure pending before a committee will be
recommended to the full Senate, and whether it should be amended in any substantive
way.” U.S. Senate, Senate Legislative Process, available at http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
210. Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold at the Senate Judiciary Constitution
Subcommittee Markup, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_
statement.cfm?id=1676&wit_id=85 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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“[t]his amendment has been around for nearly two years and we still
don’t have” an “unambiguous statement of [its] meaning.”211 He concluded, “So I would hope . . . that every Senator who is planning to vote
Yes on this amendment today will tell us before we conclude this meeting
what he thinks the amendment means.”212
Those hopes were dashed as well. The Subcommittee voted 5-4,
along party lines, to forward the Amendment to the full Judiciary
Committee without making any changes, without issuing a report, and
without offering any clarification of the Amendment’s meaning.213
When the full Judiciary Committee undertook its own markup of the
Amendment the following spring, it did so behind closed doors, away
from the public and the press, and it left no record of its proceedings.214
In a public statement, Senator Leahy dubbed the Amendment “exceedingly confusing” and noted that it remains unclear “whether the proposed Amendment would make the Vermont [civil unions] law unconstitutional.”215 But nothing was done at the markup to clear up the
confusion. According to Senator Feingold, who stormed out of the meeting in disgust, “[d]ebate and discussion were minimal.”216 At the close of
the markup, the Committee voted 10-8—again along party lines—to send
the measure to the full Senate, again without amendment, and again
without a written report clarifying the Amendment’s meaning.217
The following month, as the midterm congressional elections
neared, the full Senate once again debated and voted on the FMA. And
once again, the public discourse leading up to the Senate vote revealed
considerable confusion about what effect the Amendment would have on
civil unions.
The Amendment’s supporters repeated their assurances regarding
the narrow reach of their handiwork. The Senate Republican Policy
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Human Rights Campaign, Cynical Politics Behind Subcommittee Passage of
Discriminatory Marriage Amendment, Nov. 9, 2005, at http://www.hrc.org/issues/
marriage/1872.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Bill Summary of S.J.
Res. 1, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00001:@@@L&summ2=m&
(May 18, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that language was never
amended and showing no reports were issued).
214. See Executive Business Meeting: Markup of S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, May 18, 2006 (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) [hereinafter Feingold Statement].
215. Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
Senators Leahy and Feingold were the only committee members to make public statements
at the markup.
216. Feingold Statement, supra note 214.
217. See Tom Strode, Committee Sends Marriage Amendment to Full Senate, Baptist
Press, May 18, 2006, at http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id=23272 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also 152 Cong. Rec. S5455 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Feingold) (noting continuing absence of any “‘unambiguous statement’” of meaning
of Amendment).
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Committee declared that “this constitutional amendment does not bar
‘civil union’ . . . arrangements . . . as long as those laws are enacted through the
legislative process.”218 At a press conference urging Congress to pass the
Amendment, President Bush repeated that claim.219 Senator Allard even
went so far as to pen an op-ed in USA Today promising that his
Amendment would “leav[e] to state legislatures the freedom to address
the question of civil unions.”220
But at the same time, many opponents of the Amendment continued
to insist publicly that the sponsors were simply wrong (and intentionally
so) about its effect on civil unions. Senator Allard’s op-ed was met with a
letter to the editor in USA Today proclaiming: “As a gay conservative who
will be directly affected by this legislation, I am outraged that Sen. Allard
is misleading the American people. . . . [I]t’s likely that the amendment,
if passed, would be used to justify the invalidation of civil unions . . . .”221
A number of advocacy groups similarly declared that “the amendment’s
broad language would attack . . . civil unions.”222
In addition, a broad range of individuals and organizations from
across the political spectrum declared that the FMA was ambiguous on
this issue and could be read either to preclude or to permit legislatively
created civil unions.223 The New York Times editorialized against the
218. U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Why a Marriage Amendment Is Necessary
15 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Mar2806MarriageAmendSD.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
219. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Discusses Marriage
Protection Amendment (June 5, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/
releases/2006/06/20060605-2.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
220. Wayne Allard, Op-Ed., Protect Traditional Marriage, USA Today, June 1, 2006, at
10A.
221. Patrick M. Killen, Letter to the Editor, Marriage Bill Seeks to Strip Freedoms,
USA Today, June 7, 2006, at 10A; see also, e.g., Bruce Fein, Op-Ed., Marriage Amendment
Miscue, Wash. Times, May 23, 2006, at A19 (arguing from conservative perspective for pure
federalism amendment leaving matter to states, rather than FMA, which “precludes
legislative bodies from recognizing same-sex unions irrespective of majority sentiments”).
222. Press Release, ACLU, Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Discriminatory
Constitutional Amendment, ACLU Denounces Amending the Constitution Behind Closed
Doors (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/marriage/25602prs200605
18.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Press Release, Billy DeFrank LGBT
Cmty. Ctr., Federal Marriage Amendment Re-Introduced in the United States Senate (June
5, 2006), at http://www.defrank.org/news/2006_0605_fma.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“The amendment would also prevent legislative or judicial extension of
marriage-like rights to same-sex couples or other unmarried persons in the United
States.”).
223. Among those noting the ambiguity was Law Professor Nate Oman, see Posting of
Nate Oman to Times and Seasons, http://www.timesandseasons.org/?p=3192 (June 4,
2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and the Center for American Progress, see
Mark Agrast et al., Fact-Checking the President’s Statement on the Marriage Amendment
(June 6, 2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/06/b1736995.
html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The ambiguity was observed by liberals who
opposed the Amendment in part because of the possibility that it could preclude
legislatively created civil unions, see, e.g., Equal Rights Washington, Ask Your Elected
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Amendment in part on this ground.224
Against this backdrop, the Senate debated the Amendment over the
course of three days. The debate was a virtual carbon copy of the one
that had occurred two years earlier. Senator Allard forcefully repeated
his position on the Amendment’s limited effect on civil unions: “Just as
important as what it does do, is what it does not do. I have said it time
and time again and I say here again today for the record—the amendment does not seek to prohibit, in any way, the lawful, democratic creation of civil unions . . . .”225 Other cosponsors of the Amendment echoed
that interpretation.226 Indeed, one cosponsor—Senator Brownback, who
had chaired the Constitution Subcommittee hearings on the FMA—was
somehow willing to assert that the Amendment would allow state legislatures to authorize not only civil unions, but also gay marriage:
This is a very simple amendment. It is hard for me to understand why anybody would oppose it when 45 of 50 States have
defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and this
simply says that if States want to define it differently, they have
to go through the legislative process and not the courts, so that
the Court can’t force it. It must be done by a legislative body.
And if some States decide to do that, then that is provided for in
this amendment.227
Clearly, there remained substantial confusion (or dishonesty) even
among the Amendment’s principal backers.
On the other side of the aisle, a number of Democratic opponents of
the Amendment again declared in equally confident terms that the
Leaders to Keep Discrimination out of the US Constitution, May 31, 2006, available at
http://eqfed.org/erw/alert-description.tcl?alert_id=3748021 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ([“The Amendment] might also ban other forms of partnership recognition,
such as civil unions.”); Human Rights Campaign, Vote No on the Federal Marriage
Amendment, at http://www.hrc.org/voteno/ background.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he amendment could forever invalidate civil
unions.”), by conservatives who opposed it in part because of the ambiguity, see, e.g.,
Knight, supra note 167 (noting that Concerned Women for America did not support
Amendment as worded because it “is open to differing interpretations, and its drafters
acknowledged that it was specifically worded so state legislators could create civil unions”),
and by conservatives who supported it despite its failure to clearly ban civil unions, see,
e.g., Posting of Cory Burnell to Christian Exodus Blog, http://www.christianexodus.org/
blog/2006/06/follow-up-on-federal-marriage.html (June 5, 2006, 22:15 EST) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (concluding that Amendment “may allow civil unions,” but
arguing that conclusion “is no reason by itself to oppose” it).
224. See Editorial, On the Low Road to November, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2006, at A24.
225. 152 Cong. Rec. S5409 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard).
226. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S5534 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist)
(“Nothing in the amendment . . . stops States from passing civil union laws . . . . It simply
protects the States from having civil unions imposed on them from activist courts.”).
227. 152 Cong. Rec. S5441 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback);
see also 152 Cong. Rec. S5414 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback)
(stating amendment would allow legislatures, but not courts, to define marriage
differently).
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Amendment would preclude state legislatures from creating civil unions.
“Make no mistake,” Senator Kennedy admonished, “a vote in support of
this amendment . . . is a vote against civil unions . . . .”228 Other
Democratic opponents of the Amendment were less willing to assume the
worst, but were nonetheless troubled by the profound uncertainty.
Senator Leahy, for instance, noted that, “[a]lthough the President and
some Senate supporters contend that this proposed amendment binds
only judges and not State legislatures and that it prohibits only marriage
but not civil unions or partnerships, that is not clear in the language
. . . .”229 To many Democratic Senators, the profound uncertainty was
reason enough to vote against the Amendment:
Would this amendment outlaw civil unions? . . . [That] does
seem like an important question for supporters of this amendment to get their stories straight on. . . . The Senate and State
legislatures—not to mention the American people—deserve
clear and reliable answers to these questions before they are
asked to decide whether to amend the Constitution.230
At least one Republican Senator—Senator Warner—agreed that the
Amendment does not “speak[ ] with the clarity to which the American
people are entitled.”231 He noted that the Amendment’s supporters
“have stated that it is their intent that this second sentence will leave to
the several States the decision of whether to recognize relationships other
than marriage, such as civil unions . . . .”232 “But if that is the case,” he
queried, “why not simply state that in plain English that is understandable
for the millions upon millions of Americans who are interested in this
amendment?”233 In other words, “[w]hy not simply say that the power to
recognize or to prohibit relationships other than marriage shall be reserved to the several States?”234
228. 152 Cong. Rec. S5465 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see
also 152 Cong. Rec. S5524 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama) (stating that
similar state amendments took away domestic partnership benefits); 152 Cong. Rec. S5474
(daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[I]f [the amendment] were to
prevail . . . it is very likely all . . . domestic unions of any civil kind would be wiped out, as
well.”).
229. 152 Cong. Rec. S5530 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see
also, e.g., id. at S5528–29 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“[T]he language is vague and
overbroad. . . . There was simply no consensus [at the committee hearings] on how the
courts might interpret [it]. Some of the witnesses predicted courts would read it to ban
civil unions.”).
230. 152 Cong. Rec. S5454–55 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
231. Id. at S5449 (statement of Sen. Warner).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. Senator Warner further suggested: “Or why not simply drop the second
sentence altogether if it is confusing? Either option would clearly allow the 50 States to
work their will on the issues of civil unions or domestic partnerships.” Id. That claim is, of
course, highly suspect—and it indicates confusion even among those who were aware of
the ambiguity.
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Another Republican Senator—Senator Inhofe—essentially agreed
that the Amendment is ambiguous, but voted for it anyway: “I have listened to many of my colleagues . . . talk about some of the ways the language should be legally changed . . . . Maybe this isn’t worded exactly
right. But this is the only show in town. It is the only opportunity that we
will have to do anything.”235 To Senator Inhofe, doing something was
apparently more important than knowing what it was that he was doing.
But much to Senator Inhofe’s chagrin, nothing was done. At the
close of the debate, the Amendment failed on a procedural vote, receiving forty-nine yeas and forty-eight nays.236
Still, the failure in the Senate once again did not stop the House of
Representatives from holding its own debate and vote.237 The House debate tiresomely mirrored all of the previous congressional debates. The
Amendment’s supporters claimed that it would allow the state legislatures
to create civil unions,238 whereas many of its opponents claimed that it
would “bar[ ] States from granting pretty much any legal partnership
such as civil unions,”239 and other opponents claimed that, at the very
least, it was unacceptably ambiguous on the issue: “[T]his bill jeopardizes
not just same-sex marriage . . . but domestic partnership and civil union
laws . . . . The proposal before us is so poorly drafted that legal experts
disagree on exactly what effect it will have on those laws.”240 Ultimately,
the Amendment gained 236 votes—well over a majority, but less than the
two-thirds required by the Constitution.241
II. THE LACK OF AN ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

OF

When the Democrats gained a majority of both Houses in the 2006
congressional elections, the FMA was dropped from the legislative
agenda. For now, anyway, it has been defeated. But let us imagine what
would have happened if its sponsors had succeeded in making it the
235. 152 Cong. Rec. S5523 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
236. See id. at S5534.
237. The FMA was brought directly to the House floor by the House leadership,
without having been considered in committee. 152 Cong. Rec. H5300 (daily ed. July 18,
2006) (statement of Rep. Kolbe).
238. See, e.g., id. at H5314 (statement of Rep. Musgrave); id. at H5296 (statement of
Rep. Gingrey).
239. Id. at H5307 (statement of Rep. Lee); see also, e.g., id. at H5301 (statement of
Rep. Conyers) (stating Amendment would deny benefits of civil unions and domestic
partnerships); id. at H5298 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“[W]hen they tell you this is only
about marriage, don’t believe it.”).
240. Id. at H5288 (statement of Rep. McGovern); see also id. at H5293 (statement of
Rep. Baldwin) (“[Civil union] laws would certainly be threatened if this amendment were
to pass.”). Opponents also introduced a number of letters from advocacy organizations
bemoaning the ambiguity. See, e.g., id. at H5291 (letter from the Human Rights
Campaign); id. (letter from the National Council of Jewish Women).
241. See id. at H5320.
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Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Surely a case challenging the constitutionality of civil unions under the new Amendment would
quickly have found its way into court. Let us further imagine that that
case were to arrive on the desk of a conscientious, committed originalist
judge.
In the days of the “old originalism,” our originalist judge would have
searched the recent historical materials canvassed above for evidence of
the original intent of the framers. In so doing, she would naturally have
been dubious of the claims by the FMA’s opponents that it would ban
civil unions; since they were not the people who voted for the
Amendment and gave it the force of law, their intentions do not matter.
Rather, she would have focused on the numerous statements of the
Amendment’s sponsors insisting that they intended their bill to have no
effect on legislatively created civil unions. Indeed, the sponsors envisioned that future judges would do just that. Representative Musgrave
declared that the public confusion over the reach of the FMA was inconsequential because “[f]uture courts will have no doubt about what the
legislative intent was.”242 Echoed Judge Bork: “It was hoped that this
objection could be avoided by making the intention of the sentence clear
in the debates that would surround the amendment in Congress and, if
sent to the states, in the ratification debates.”243
Still, to the extent that “original intent” originalists looked to the
intent of the drafters of the provision,244 our judge would have been perplexed, as the principal drafters had differing intentions. In addition,
there are indications that even those drafters and framers who publicly
expressed an intent to leave the civil unions issue to the states may not
have been honest about their actual intentions, and many other framers
who remained silent may well have supported the Amendment because
they intended (or at least hoped) that notwithstanding the moderate
politicking of its sponsors, it would ultimately be used to strike down civil
unions. As such, the intent of the framers would have been quite difficult
to discern.
But in any event, now that original intent originalism has been
largely abandoned,245 our hypothetical originalist judge would instead
seek the original public meaning of the Amendment: the meaning that
the Amendment had at the time that it was adopted. In articulating how
she would go about doing that, one must be careful not to assume that all
242. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
243. May 13, 2004 Hearing, supra note 65, at 18.
244. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of
a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 456 (1986) (“The standard of interpretation
applied by the judiciary must focus on the text and the drafter’s original intent.”). But see
Berger, supra note 2, at 640–41 (arguing that, while drafters’ intentions and
understandings are usually dispositive, that is only true when they are in accord with those
of ratifiers).
245. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
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originalists would endorse the same approach. Originalism, even in its
“original meaning” incarnation, is a very broad tent. Originalists disagree
in important ways about the meaning of “original meaning.” To simplify
somewhat, those various originalists who espouse fidelity to the principle
of original public meaning tend to use that term to express three related,
but conceptually distinct, notions: original expected application, original
public understanding, and original, objective textual meaning. These are
not three distinct schools of thought as much as they are three ranges on
the continuum of originalist theory; they often bleed together, and many
originalists have at times made statements consistent with more than one
of them.246 But it is helpful to separate them as a conceptual framework
for approaching the originalist endeavor.
A. Original Expected Application
The narrowest form of original meaning jurisprudence is what Jack
Balkin calls “original expected application.”247 The premise of original
expected application originalism is not only that the meaning of a constitutional provision is determined by “the meanings that words had at the
time they were adopted” as “read in light of [the provision’s] underlying
principles,” but also that “the concepts and principles underlying those
words must be applied in the same way that they would have been applied
when they were adopted.”248 Thus, the original meaning of a constitutional provision is determined and constrained by the expectations of the
framing generation as to how that provision would be applied to particular problems. If the Framers would have expected the Constitution to
permit something, then it is permitted today, and if they would have expected it to preclude something, then it is precluded today.
This principle is distinct, at least conceptually, from “original intent
originalism.” It seeks to apply the original public meaning of the words
that the Framers enacted, rather than the subjective, private intentions
that motivated the decision to enact them. But one consequence of its
defining the notion of original meaning narrowly, such that constitutional questions must be answered the same way today as they would have
been answered at the time of the framing, is that it essentially posits that
in certain circumstances the judge need not articulate the original meaning at all. In a sense, it treats the first step of the traditional two step
originalist inquiry—(1) what was the original meaning?; (2) how does
that meaning apply to the problem at hand?—as sometimes unnecessary.
If we can determine how the framing generation would have expected
the constitutional provision to apply to the practice at issue, then there is
246. Justice Scalia, for instance, has at various points endorsed all three. See infra
notes 251–252, 275, 299 and accompanying text.
247. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5–7, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Balkin, Abortion].
248. Id. at 6.
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no reason to ascertain or articulate the original meaning. We already
know the answer to the ultimate question posed in step two, so we need
not bother with step one.249 The Framers’ original expectations that the
provision would (or would not) apply to a particular practice are incontrovertible evidence that the original meaning of the provision—whatever
it may be—is such that it would (or would not) bar that practice. To
interpret the Constitution to allow a practice that the Framers expected
would be prohibited, or vice versa, is to impermissibly change the meaning of the Constitution.250
This brand of originalism is often practiced by Justice Scalia.251 He
has repeatedly endorsed the proposition that if the Framers expected a
practice to be constitutional then it necessarily remains constitutional
today.252
On this theory, to determine whether civil unions are constitutional,
our judge would need to ascertain how the American public would have
expected the FMA to apply to civil unions. It is not just the expectations
of the framers themselves that matter; that would just be a form of original intent jurisprudence. What matters on this theory is the public meaning of the text as conclusively established by the shared expectations of
everyone—both supporters and opponents of the Amendment—about its
likely effect.253
249. See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
Geo. L.J. 569, 581 (1998) (explaining, but not endorsing, this principle).
250. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50
St. Louis U. L.J. 555, 556 (2006) (explaining, but not endorsing, this principle).
251. See id. at 556–58; see also Balkin, Abortion, supra note 247 (manuscript at 6–7);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About
Abortion), 24 Const. Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5–7, on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Greenberg & Litman, supra note 249, at 572, 574–82. Justice Scalia
once remarked that he rejects any “manner of interpretation that permits application of
the [constitutional] provision to evolve over time.” Antonin Scalia, D.C. Circuit Judge,
Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington,
D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney
General, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101, 103 (1987).
252. For instance, the fact that the Framers understood the death penalty not to be
cruel and unusual punishment is, to Justice Scalia, permanently dispositive of the question
whether the death penalty is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See Antonin
Scalia, Response, in A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 129, 145 [hereinafter
Scalia, Response]. Often, Justice Scalia determines the original expected application by
asking whether the framing generation engaged in a practice shortly after ratification. If
so, then they obviously had not expected that practice to be precluded, in which case the
practice remains permissible today. Thus, for instance, the fact that the early Congresses
and Presidents engaged in public prayer is permanently dispositive of the question
whether the Establishment Clause allows government-sanctioned displays of religion, and
we can reach that conclusion without having to articulate the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885–905 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const.
Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 25, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption] (explaining that original expected
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But that is a task that simply cannot be performed. The only conclusion that can possibly be drawn from the exhaustive evidence set out in
Part I of this Article is that the American public (and the Congress, for
that matter) did not know and could not have known what to expect.
Some liberals, libertarians, and federalist conservatives opposed the FMA
because they expected it to ban civil unions, and other liberals, libertarians, and federalists opposed it even though they expected it to allow civil
unions. Some moderates supported it because they expected it to allow
civil unions, but other moderates opposed it because they expected it to
ban civil unions. Some social conservatives supported it because they expected it to ban civil unions (notwithstanding what its sponsors had been
saying), other social conservatives opposed it because they expected it to
allow civil unions, and still other social conservatives supported it despite the
fact that they expected it to allow civil unions. On top of that, each side
repeatedly accused the other of intentionally lying about how the
Amendment would apply to civil unions. And not surprisingly, a great
many frustrated observers from across the political spectrum threw up
their hands and announced that they simply had no idea what effect the
Amendment would have on civil unions; they had no expectations about
its application.
In the face of this historical record, our judge would be at a loss. Any
effort to cut through the rhetoric in pursuit of the “true” expectations
would be futile. To begin with, there is no way that our judge would be
able to conclude that the FMA’s opponents were correct when they accused its sponsors of lying about their actual expectations for the
Amendment’s effects on civil unions. It would be quite a remarkable
form of expectations originalism that ignored the repeated, consistent,
and facially earnest public statements of the framers about the effect of
their amendment. The historical record yields its doubts, to be sure, but
it does not even come close to proving the existence of a massive, coordinated coverup on the part of the FMA’s supporters.
It might be more plausible for our judge to reach the opposite conclusion: that it was the opponents of the FMA who were lying when they
insisted that they expected it to ban civil unions. They knew full well that
it would not ban civil unions, and they were intentionally misrepresenting
its moderate effects in order to scare moderates away from voting for it.
But that argument will not work either. If the opponents were intentionally muddying the waters, they were unquestionably successful at it. So
much of the public (and even the Congress) was deceived or at least confused by their allegations that there were no shared public expectations
about the Amendment’s effects on civil unions.
And in any event, fairly read, the historical record does not yield the
conclusion that the FMA’s opponents were lying about their expectaapplication asks “how the framing generation would have expected the text would be
applied”).
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tions. The FMA’s opponents had many reasons to legitimately fear that
the Amendment would operate to ban civil unions and that it was in fact
the Amendment’s supporters who were being disingenuous when they
promised otherwise.
For one thing, of course, two of the three principal drafters of the
Amendment asserted that it would preclude civil unions. In addition, the
plain language of the second sentence of the original version of the FMA
was most naturally read to do so. And even after the second sentence was
revised, the first sentence continued to lend itself to an extremely plausible interpretation that the states could not grant the substantive
equivalent of marriage to gay couples, regardless of what label they chose
to place upon it. As Professor Dale Carpenter wrote at the time:
Once the revised amendment is ratified, opponents of civil unions can be expected to argue that legislatures cannot circumvent the substance of the amendment by giving same-sex
couples everything marriage confers under a different title. . . .
A person could not be convicted of Treason on the testimony of
one witness, rather than the constitutionally required two witnesses, simply by calling the same offense ‘Schmeason.’254
Indeed, from the very beginning of the civil union debate in
Vermont, social conservative opponents had tirelessly criticized civil unions as no different from marriage.255 And in other contexts courts had
already recognized that a “civil union is indistinguishable from marriage,
notwithstanding that the Vermont legislature withheld the title of
marriage.”256
254. Dale Carpenter, Four Arguments Against a Marriage Amendment That Even an
Opponent of Gay Marriage Should Accept, 2 U. St. Thomas L.J. 71, 93 (2004). That
argument would not, of course, have been a slam dunk. To many people, civil unions, by
creating a “separate but equal” institution, are inherently degrading and inferior (and thus
not identical) to marriage. See, e.g., Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: The Unfinished
Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 149, 242 (2000) (arguing that
“Vermont’s separate but equal system of marriage ought to be held unconstitutional”);
Evan Wolfson, Interview: Why the Boy Scouts Case Went Down, Gay & Lesbian Rev.
Worldwide, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 15, 17 (noting that civil unions do “not assure people the full
respect and legal protections that marriage has traditionally received in this country”).
255. See, e.g., David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a
Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 61, 64–67 (2000) (arguing that, in finding
right to civil unions, Vermont Supreme Court had actually redefined marriage); Mello,
supra note 254, at 208 (“‘Homosexual or lesbian marriage, by whatever label you substitute
for its name, is not a civil right; it is a moral wrong.’” (quoting Richard Baldwin, Not Right
to Redefine Marriage, Rutland Herald, Mar. 18, 2000, at 8)); Andrea Lafferty, Editorial,
Constitution Should Ban Gay Marriage, Columbus Dispatch, June 24, 2006, at A12 (“Civil
Unions are homosexual marriages.”).
256. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417–18 (Sup. Ct. 2003). Other
courts, however, had taken the Vermont legislature at its word and concluded that a civil
union should not be treated as a marriage. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48–49
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that under Vermont law, civil union does not bestow same
status as civil marriage, and holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require
Georgia to recognize Vermont civil union as marriage).
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In addition, a number of state attorneys general had already formally
concluded that their state defense of marriage acts—which precluded
recognition of same-sex marriages performed out of state, but said nothing about civil unions—should be read to bar recognition of out-of-state
civil unions as well. Their theory was that a ban on same-sex marriage
naturally applies to other relationships that provide the rights, even if not
the label, of marriage.257 Social conservatives had pushed that theory in
state courts as well.258 In addition, using this same reasoning, they had
also aggressively argued in courts around the country that local domestic
partnership laws are trumped by state laws banning gay marriage259 and
that state domestic partnership laws are unconstitutional under state constitutional amendments banning gay marriage260 even when those marriage bans apply on their face only to “marriage” and not to civil unions
or domestic partnerships. Similarly, they had argued in state courts that
state constitutional marriage bans preclude any argument that same-sex
couples are constitutionally entitled to enter into civil unions, because
“the term ‘marriage’ should be interpreted to include both marriage licenses and those rights, responsibilities, benefits and burdens that flow
from marital status.”261
257. See Op. Att’y Gen. No. 00-017, at 8–9 (Ill. Dec. 29, 2000) (opining that, because
“difference between a civil union in Vermont and a same-sex marriage . . . is merely a
matter of nomenclature,” “Vermont same-sex civil unions are equivalent to same-sex
marriages, for purposes of [the] Illinois law” that provides that “‘marriage between 2
individuals of the same sex is contrary to the public policy of this State’” (quoting Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/213.1 (West 1998)); Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 2000-129, at 5, 12 (Ala. Apr. 20, 2000) (opining that recognizing Vermont
civil union would run afoul of Alabama Marriage Protection Act, which provides that
“‘marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state’” (quoting
Alabama Marriage Protection Act, Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (1998))).
258. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief at *5, Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court for Woodbury
County, 698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005) (No. 03-1982), 2004 WL 4912311 (arguing that Iowa
courts should not recognize Vermont civil unions because “the people of Iowa have
enacted a law specifically preserving marriage for couples comprised of one man and one
woman” and Vermont civil unions “do not comport with this definition of marriage”).
259. See Brief of Appellees at *25–*30, Devlin v. City of Phila., 862 A.2d 1234 (Pa.
2004) (No. 43 EAP 2003), 2003 WL 23515737 (arguing that state law banning gay marriage
preempts life partner provisions of Philadelphia’s Fair Practices Ordinance); Brief in
Support of Affirmance for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Catholic Conference at *7–*8,
Devlin, 862 A.2d 1234 (No. 43 EAP 2003), 2003 WL 23515742 (arguing that local “life
partnership” ordinance ran afoul of state ban on gay marriage because it “effectively
created a new class of marital status” and “create[d] a subset of marriage for homosexual
partners”).
260. See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 696–97 (Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting social conservatives’ argument that California defense of marriage amendment
“protects the institution of marriage itself, which they contend requires that the myriad of
rights, benefits, and obligations associated therewith must be reserved only for married
persons”).
261. Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawaii Catholic Conference, Baehr v.
Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (No. 20371); see also Defendant-Appellant’s
Supplemental Reply Brief, Baehr, 994 P.2d 566 (No. 20371).
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What is more, during the various campaigns in the states, contemporaneous with the FMA, to amend state constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, it was a common tactic for the sponsors and supporters of those
amendments to disingenuously claim on the campaign trail that the
amendments would have no effect on civil unions when, in fact, the proposed constitutional language explicitly foreclosed them.262 This campaign of misinformation led to a number of these ballot initiatives passing easily, even though exit polls showed that a substantial majority of the
voters actually favored allowing gays and lesbians to enter into civil
unions.263
All of these events surely gave FMA opponents and the American
public reason to doubt the genuineness of (or at the very least, the ability
to follow through on) the promises about civil unions made by the sponsors and supporters of the Amendment. Indeed, the Marriage
Amendment Project—an organization that had been created by the
Arlington Group to promote the FMA and that had been promising that
the FMA did not reach civil unions—was housed in the offices of the
Family Research Council.264 The Family Research Council had been at
the forefront of the grassroots effort to pass the Amendment. But at the
same time, not only was it publicly opposed to civil unions,265 but it also
initially denounced the FMA for failing to ban civil unions.266 Subsequently, it suddenly changed its tune (perhaps after having been informed of the likelihood that the FMA would actually go further than its
sponsors were letting on), and then fervently insisted that Congress pass
the FMA without any change in wording despite the known ambiguity,267
while at the same time participating as an amicus curiae in state court
litigation arguing that domestic partnerships and civil unions are inconsistent with bans on same-sex “marriage.”268
262. See Thomas Oliphant, Editorial, The Gay Marriage Deception, Boston Globe,
Nov. 7, 2004, at D11.
263. See id.; Liptak, supra note 192.
264. See Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? (It’s the Gay
Part), N.Y. Times, June 19, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 34, 36–37.
265. See Peter Sprigg, Family Research Council, Questions and Answers: What’s
Wrong with Letting Same-Sex Couples “Marry”? 7, available at http://www.dvstudios.com/
ccn/ Questions_Answers.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing against civil unions on ground that legal benefits of marriage should be
restricted to heterosexual partnerships because only heterosexual partnerships are socially
beneficial).
266. See Ponnuru, Jitters, supra note 39, at 32; Kurtz, supra note 48.
267. See Press Release, Family Research Council, FRC Urges Senators to Support the
Marriage Protection Amendment (Nov. 2, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Today, the Family Research Council urged Senators on the Judiciary Committee to
support the Marriage Protection Amendment and to oppose any changes in its language in
‘markup’ sessions this week.”).
268. See Same Sex Marriage Benefits Fought Here in Pennsylvania, Pa. Citizen, May
2004, at 4, 4.
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And finally, the FMA’s opponents could rationally have expected
that it might operate to ban civil unions because it was never rewritten to
eliminate the ambiguity, despite the fact that it would have been simple
to do so. Time and time again, critics of the ambiguous language proposed alternate phrasing that would have definitively and explicitly allowed civil unions.269 Yet the only revision that was ever made to the
Amendment served only to give the illusion of increased clarity while in
fact leaving the essential ambiguity in place. As Senator Warner lamented on the Senate floor, if the Amendment truly was intended to
“leave to the several States the decision of whether to recognize relationships other than marriage, such as civil unions,” then “why not simply
state that in plain English . . . ?”270
The answer to that question is the key to understanding the FMA.
Saying so “in plain English” would have given the social conservatives no
reason to hope that the Amendment would be interpreted to meet their
goals, which would have caused them to abandon their support. The fact
that the sponsors repeatedly refused to address the civil unions issue in
plain English—the fact that they kept coming back again and again with
the same proposal despite being fully aware of its profound ambiguity—
surely made it reasonable for opponents to believe that the sponsors may
have been up to something untoward. Or at the very least, it was not
unreasonable for them to believe that the sponsors embraced the ambiguity as a necessary means of holding together a disparate coalition that
had differing expectations about its application. There was, accordingly,
no shared expectation of the application of the FMA to civil unions.
Original expected application does not yield an answer.
B. Original Public Understanding
Because it is often practiced by the originalist with the most power
and the loftiest pulpit—Justice Scalia—original expected application
must be taken seriously. But it would be a mistake to assume, as many
commentators seem to do, that original expected application is the prevailing academic model of originalism. In fact, most academic originalists
have rejected original expected application as a misunderstanding of
original meaning.271 They believe that the expectations of the framing
generation as to the specific application of a constitutional provision are
269. For one suggested phrasing, see Balkin, Balkinization, supra note 104. Similarly,
many opponents of civil unions who were unhappy with the ambiguity proposed
alternative language that would have unequivocally banned them. See, e.g., Knight, supra
note 167; Rice, supra note 71.
270. 152 Cong. Rec. S5449 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Warner); see
also Carpenter, supra note 254, at 93 (“If the purpose of the revised second sentence is to
make it clear that legislatures—but not courts or executives—–may grant same-sex couples
‘the legal incidents’ of marriage, why not just say so directly rather than by negative
implication?”).
271. See Berman, supra note 251, at 3–4; Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of
Humility in Judicial Review, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1284 (1997) [hereinafter
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often compelling evidence of the original public meaning of that provision, but are not dispositive.272 Originalists generally care about what the
people thought the text meant, not necessarily how they thought it would
apply to a particular set of facts. It is possible that the framing generation
misunderstood the way in which the principle that they enacted would
apply to particular facts, or that their understanding of the facts was mistaken, or that the world has changed enough that the principle now applies differently to those same facts.273 Because originalism is premised
on the notion that, “[i]n ratifying the document, the people appropriated it, giving its text the meaning that was publicly understood,”274 what
matters to most originalists is the original understanding of the principle
that was embodied in the text, not the narrow original expectations of
how that principle would apply in particular situations.275
Thus, many modern, sophisticated originalists seek to uncover the
“public understanding” of the meaning of the constitutional provision:276
“what the original language actually meant to those who used the terms
in question;”277 the “meaning of the provision to the public on whose
behalf it was ratified.”278 They recognize that the Framers and the peoMcConnell, Importance of Humility] (explaining that very few originalists take position
that Framers’ expectations are controlling).
272. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 43
(1994) (“That the ratifiers may not have believed . . . that the practice did not violate the
directive—is not determinative.”); Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 622;
Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 1, at 610–11.
273. See Green, supra note 250, passim; Greenberg & Litman, supra note 249, passim.
274. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original
Intent, and Judicial Review 60 (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation].
275. When Ronald Dworkin pointed out this distinction, see Ronald Dworkin,
Comment, in A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 115, 115–16, Justice Scalia
claimed that he too believes that public meaning, rather than expected application,
controls, see Scalia, Response, supra note 252, at 144. Sometimes, Justice Scalia does
indeed seem to endorse this proposition. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
379, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (surmising that, although “the terms in the
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their ratification,”
“a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest [that] would have been considered impermissible in 1791” may be
permissible today in light of changes in the habits of criminals in carrying concealed
weapons). See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(seeking “original understanding of the Constitution”). But usually, he does not. See
supra note 251 and accompanying text.
276. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 331, 339 (2004).
277. Stephen G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1081, 1081 (2005).
278. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1991) [hereinafter Perry, Legitimacy]; see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 29
(2000) (“What counts as text is the document as understood by the American People who
ratified and amended it . . . .”); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of
the Past, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the idea that the words
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ple often could not agree amongst themselves on how they expected the
provision to apply to “particular fact situations,” but they believe that the
people nonetheless understood a single public meaning, or “major premise,” reflected in the constitutional language.279
Applying this theory, our hypothetical originalist judge would not be
stumped by the fact that the people had differing expectations about
whether the FMA would ban civil unions. Undeterred, our judge would
endeavor to discern the principle that the FMA enacts—the shared public understanding of the meaning of its words—and then apply that principle herself to resolve the question whether civil unions are
constitutional.
To determine the public’s shared understanding of provisions of the
original Constitution, originalists consult a wide array of historical evidence, including “public discussion,” the “records of the Philadelphia
convention, records of ratifying conventions, the newspaper accounts of
the day, the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist Papers,” and the “decisions of the early courts, as well as treatises by men who . . . were thoroughly familiar with the thought of the time.”280 Updating those sources
for a modern-era amendment would mean looking at, among other
things, the public discussion of the amendment, newspaper accounts, editorials and political blogs—the best of which could be thought of as The
Federalist and the Anti-Federalist Papers of the twenty-first century—congressional debates and hearings, judicial decisions, and law review
articles.
Our judge would look to all of those sources to determine the public
understanding of the meaning of the FMA. But of course, the people are
concerned with, and thus talk about, the real-world effects of constitutional amendments, not their abstract meanings. The people (and the
legislators) care what an amendment will do, not what it means. As such,
“it is hard to ascertain what constitutional provisions mean without reference to expected applications.”281 As a practical matter, expected application is often the best measure of original meaning; our best clue for
what the people thought a constitutional provision meant was what they
thought it would do. 282 Indeed, the people’s own understanding of what
the provision meant was likely shaped primarily by their expectations of
how it would be applied to particular practices.283 Thus, in practice, original expected application will often determine original meaning, even for
of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at
the time of enactment.”).
279. Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 162–63.
280. Id. at 144, 165; see also Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 852, 856 (noting that
originalist interpretation requires consulting these sources).
281. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as
the Core of Originalism, 24 Const. Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 6, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
282. See id.
283. See id. (manuscript at 7).

R
R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-3\COL301.txt

582

unknown

Seq: 54

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

25-MAR-08

12:26

[Vol. 108:529

those who reject the notion that original expected application is necessarily dispositive.284
It follows that if there was public disagreement on expected application, then it is quite likely that there was no public agreement on original
meaning either. And so it is here. Those who thought that the FMA
would allow civil unions must have thought (to the extent that they considered its textual meaning at all) that it protects only the word “marriage.” Those who thought that it would ban civil unions must have
thought that it protects the institution of marriage.
That is, in fact, just what the history shows. Those legal experts and
commentators who thought carefully about and parsed out the actual text
of the FMA reached sharply differing conclusions about its meaning. The
profound disagreement recounted above among the drafters themselves,
among the law professors called to testify in congressional hearings, and
among the bloggers and interest groups all reflected a demonstrable (indeed, undeniable) lack of public consensus about the meaning of the
language of the FMA.285
That disagreement about the meaning of the text (not just its likely
application) was both widespread and publicly acknowledged. The
Washington Post, for instance, ran a story explaining that “more than 100
members of Congress have co-sponsored the proposed amendment, and
White House aides say President Bush is about to endorse it. Yet there is
no consensus—even among its authors—about what the text means.”286
The Post story continued, “Though it is just two sentences long, the
amendment’s possible interpretations are a matter of furious debate
among constitutional scholars and political activists, with some contending that it would allow Vermont-style civil unions and others saying it
would not.”287 Even Wikipedia, perhaps the ultimate measure of what information (and misinformation) is widely available to the public, notes
that “legal scholars still question[ ] whether civil unions would be permitted” by the language of the FMA.288 The inescapable conclusion is that
284. See Scalia, Response, supra note 252, at 144 (noting that these “two concepts
chase one and another back and forth to some extent, since the import of language
depends upon its context, which includes the occasion for, and hence the evident purpose
of, its utterance”); Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 253 (manuscript at
26–27) (“Today’s original meaning originalists often view original expected applications as
very strong evidence of original meaning, even (or perhaps especially) when the text
points to abstract principals or standards.”).
285. Before the Amendment was revised, the public disagreement centered on the
meaning of the second sentence, not the first. But it was equally as deep and widespread.
286. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
287. Id.
288. Federal Marriage Amendment, Wikipedia, at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Federal_Marriage_Amendment (last modified Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Indeed, the history of edits to the Wikipedia entry on the FMA evinces a
profound and ongoing confusion about whether and to what extent the Amendment
would operate to ban civil unions. See Revision History of Federal Marriage Amendment,
Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Federal_Marriage_Amendment
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there was no “general and publicly shared meaning[ ] of the text at the
time . . . .”289 Original public understanding thus does not yield an answer either.
C. Original, Objective-public-meaning Textualism
As some of its leading proponents have explained, “originalism as a
theory of constitutional interpretation is still trying to work itself pure.”290
Over the last decade, scholarship on the vanguard of originalist thought
has been moving the theory steadily away from the history and toward the
text.291 The newest generation of originalists seek neither the original
intention of the Framers nor the original understanding of the people.292
Rather, they seek to determine how the words of the Constitution “would
have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they
were adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which
they were adopted.”293 Some of its proponents have labeled this theory
“original, objective-public-meaning textualism.”294
The distinction between this revised originalism and the thinking
that preceded it is that the concern is no longer with how the words of
the Constitution were actually understood by the Framers, the ratifiers,
the public, or anyone else, but rather with how an objective, hypothetical
reader should have and likely would have understood them had he been
fully informed. These originalists “do not regard the search for original
meaning as a search for historically concrete understandings. Instead,
[they] conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms . . . .”295 As Gary
Lawson, perhaps the leading advocate of this theory, explains:
[It] is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to know about the
Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a
particular provision. Actual historical understandings are, of
course, relevant to that inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the inquiry—nor are they even necessarily the best available
evidence.296
&action=history (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing
numerous revisions to Federal Marriage Amendment entry on Wikipedia).
289. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 253 (manuscript at 21).
290. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1127.
291. See id. at 1139–44 (noting that originalist thought has moved away from
positions taken by Judge Bork and Justice Scalia).
292. See id. at 1132.
293. Id.
294. Id. (emphasis omitted).
295. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 25 (2001).
296. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 398 (2002)
[hereinafter Lawson, Delegation].
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Accordingly, objective meaning textualists place significantly less
weight on the type of historical evidence outlined in Part I of this Article
than do other originalists. As Lawson explains, “[i]f the object of
originalist inquiry is a concrete, subjective understanding—either of
some privileged group of founders or ratifiers or some more amorphous
general public—then careful exegesis of historical sources becomes the
sine qua non of originalist inquiry.”297 But if, as this theory holds, “the
proper object of originalist inquiry is something a bit more hypothetical,
such as the understanding that the general public would have had if all
relevant information and arguments had been brought to its attention,
historical sources remain relevant and probative but are inconclusive.”298
What matters more is evidence of the general meaning of the words and
phrases used in the constitutional text; dictionaries, rather than The
Federalist and the like, are the primary sources of constitutional meaning.
As one scholar has explained, it “can be very disappointing for critics of
originalism—and especially for historians” to read recent originalist
scholarship, because they “expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to find references to dictionaries” and “common contemporary
meanings . . . .”299 This newest originalism is largely a variant of
textualism.
If our originalist judge were to pursue this line of thinking in interpreting the FMA, then she would not be discouraged by the fact that
there was no actual, shared public understanding of the meaning of the
text any more than she would be deterred by the fact that there was no
single intent of the Framers and no shared public expectation of how the
Amendment would apply to civil unions. Rather, she would opine that,
due to imperfect information, misleading rhetoric, or flawed interpretation, the true meaning of the text of the FMA had been wrongly understood by one side or the other.300 Her task would be to use the tools of
textualist interpretation to determine which side had it right.
297. Id. at 341 n.51.
298. Id.
299. Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 621. Justice Scalia has asserted that he
employs a constitutional interpretation very much like this. See Scalia, Common-Law
Courts, supra note 6, at 38 (claiming to use historical sources like The Federalist only as
evidence of standard contemporary usage of the words in Constitution). But in fact, he
usually uses historical sources more directly to prove the actual original understanding and
expected application of constitutional provisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the
Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1301, 1303–07, 1312–14 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge, Supreme Court]; Aileen
Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 Am. J.
Juris. 255, 279–82, 296–97 (2002).
300. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause: Article VII
and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 83, 91–92 (2002)
(noting possibility that majority, and conceivably even unanimous, understanding of
constitutional provision held by public at time of enactment might not be actual objective
public meaning because people could have been unaware of, have undervalued, or have
refused for political reasons to acknowledge particular feature of the text). Perhaps the
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But that too would be a fruitless quest. Having conducted the extensive research necessary to draft Part I of this Article, I am, I would like to
think, fully informed of all of the possible arguments about the meaning
of the Amendment. And yet I do not know which meaning is the “correct” one. Fully comprehended, the text does not yield an answer.301 It
only begs the question.
Textual analysis stumbles when the dispute centers on interpreting a
word whose meaning was hotly contested in contemporary discourse, as
was true of the word “marriage” during the debate over the FMA. To
some, marriage was (and is) “a one-flesh communion of persons consummated and actualized in the reproductive-type acts of spouses”—a committed, divinely sanctioned sexual union of a man and a woman.302 To
others, marriage was (and is) “at once a deeply personal commitment to
another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family”; its essence does
not depend on the sex of the participants.303 The Amendment was proposed precisely because, in the words of one of its backers, “our cultural
consensus on the meaning of marriage has been lost.”304 Its backers were
“seeking to establish, in the fundamental law, the essential meaning of
marriage as the union only of a man and a woman.”305 But the
most compelling example of the extent to which originalists of this stripe are willing to
deviate from the historical sources is a recent essay by Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson
concluding that textual and intratextual analysis establishes the proper meaning of the
words of Article III, even though Calabresi and Lawson are willing to concede that the
historical sources convincingly indicate that the framing generation actually understood
Article III to have a different meaning. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002 (2007). It is worth noting that, in
endorsing an interpretation favored by the political left, Calabresi and Lawson’s essay
serves as a compelling counterweight to those who would argue that originalists selectively
employ their theory only as a means to conservative political ends.
301. Perhaps practitioners of this brand of originalism could have concluded that the
original FMA, before revision, had an objective meaning. Professor Volokh’s reading of
the original language of the second sentence strikes me as so compelling as a matter of
pure text, and the contrary readings offered by the Amendment’s backers seem so weak,
that this might be a rare example of a constitutional provision with a discernable, objective
textual meaning that runs contrary to the meaning asserted by its sponsors. (To reach this
conclusion, however, one would have to say that a great many intelligent people, including
Judge Bork, were objectively wrong about the meaning of the text.) The revised
Amendment is not susceptible to the same argument.
302. Bradley, supra note 43, at 748.
303. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–55 (Mass. 2003). See
generally Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 255 (discussing competing visions of definition
of marriage at issue in same-sex union dispute); Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of
Marriage, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 195 (1997) (reviewing Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage
and the Constitution (1997)) (same).
304. Kurtz, supra note 48.
305. Hadley Arkes, Sleight of Hand, Nat’l Rev. Online, Aug. 14, 2001, at http://
www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-arkesprint081401.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (emphasis added). See generally Mae Kuykendall, Gay Marriages
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Amendment does not so much define the term as prescribe a rule with a
meaning and scope that are dependent upon which definition we choose
to adopt. Does the mandate that “marriage in the United States shall
consist only of the union of a man and a woman” mean that the government may bestow recognition and benefits upon loving, committed, romantic relationships only between members of the opposite sex, or does
it mean only that no union except that of a man and a woman can be
labeled by the state as a “marriage”? The answer to that question depends on which of the two understandings of “marriage” is correct, a
question manifestly begged, but not answered, by the text of the
Amendment.306
Because our language, our law, and our culture did not at the time
share a definition of the key disputed term in the FMA, there is no way to
objectively determine the original meaning of the Amendment through
textual analysis. The mere fact that so many intelligent, informed people,
including the Amendment’s authors themselves, disagreed on the meaning of the text is compelling evidence that these words, at that time, in
that context, did not have a single, objective meaning with regard to this
issue. Thus, original, objective-public-meaning textualism also fails to
yield an answer.
III. THE FALSE PROMISE

OF

ORIGINALISM

The foregoing establishes that, whatever strand of originalism one
chooses to pursue, there was no original public meaning of the Federal
Marriage Amendment, at least not one that could answer the most obvious and important question posed by its interpretation. What, if anything, does that tell us about the viability of originalism as a means of
constraining judicial discretion in interpreting the rest of the
Constitution?
I submit that, while it of course proves nothing, it nonetheless casts a
great deal of light on the limits of originalism. In seeking the original
public meaning of the very recent FMA, we do not need to confront many
of the substantial obstacles that usually challenge the originalist enterprise: the fact that most of the historical materials casting light on constitutional meaning are profoundly unreliable (the extant records of the
and Civil Unions: Democracy, the Judiciary and Discursive Space in the Liberal Society, 52
Mercer L. Rev. 1003 (2001) (arguing that gay marriage and civil unions debate, as it
unfolds in courts, legislatures, and society, is all about evolution of language and discourse
of marriage).
306. Ironically, to choose the more liberal definition—marriage is a loving union of
two people—is to produce the more conservative result—only opposite-sex loving unions
can be recognized. And to choose the more conservative definition—marriage is an
opposite-sex union—is to produce the more liberal result—same-sex unions are not
marriages and hence are not affected by the first sentence of the Amendment. This irony
perhaps helps to explain why many liberals read the text to ban same-sex civil unions and
many conservatives read it to allow them.
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state ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, for example,
are woefully incomplete and were intentionally manipulated and selectively edited by partisans307); the fact that the Framers probably never
discussed or even thought about the precise question at bar (and likely
never thought about anything bearing even a slight resemblance to it);308
the fact that the world has changed so much since the framing that it
often is maddeningly anachronistic to ask how the Framers would have
thought that their provision would apply to the modern practice in question;309 and the fact that the passage of time makes it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to avoid infusing the search for original meaning
with our own subjective, modern understandings.310 In the case of the
FMA’s application to civil unions, the historical record is complete and
unaltered, the “framers” actively discussed the question, and the question
was every bit as central to the world in which they were living as it is in
ours, since they are us and their world is our world. What is more, the
FMA is a narrow amendment, targeted at and facially capable of covering
only a small category of issues—unlike, say, the textually expansive Equal
Protection, Privileges or Immunities, and Due Process Clauses. And yet
we still cannot discern its original public meaning.
Put simply, if we cannot even find the original public meaning of (1)
a very narrow amendment designed to confront a single subject, (2) debated in the last few years, such that none of the evidence has been lost,
and such that (3) the question is one with as much relevance in the
Framers’ world as in our own, (4) with a public record far more detailed,
rich, and accurate than had previously been generated by American constitution-making, and (5) with regard to a central question posed and
expressly discussed ad nauseam in that debate, then we surely cannot expect to routinely find and apply the original public meaning of (1) capacious, open-ended provisions (2) debated more than a century or two
ago, (3) where the historical record is much more sparse and unreliable,
(4) with regard to a question never contemplated by the drafters and
ratifiers, (5) as applied to a world very different from the one that they
knew.

307. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12–24, 36 (1986).
308. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 17, at 1093–95 (noting that many contemporary
issues could not even have been conceived of at time of Framing); H. Jefferson Powell,
Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 664–65 (1987) [hereinafter Powell, Rules]
(“[T]he vast majority of contemporary constitutional disputes involve facts, practices, and
problems that were not considered or even dreamt of by the founders.”).
309. See, e.g., Eskridge, Supreme Court, supra note 299, at 1310–11; Powell, Rules,
supra note 308, at 673.
310. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The
Persistent Quest for Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 613,
634–36 (1997).
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Indeed, the lesson of the FMA is that the problem with originalism is
not just that it is difficult (or even impossible) to determine the original
meaning of constitutional provisions given the passage of time. The
problem is that, when it comes to constitutional provisions that addressed
a controversial subject about which the American people cared deeply at
the time of enactment, there probably never was a single original meaning to begin with. The truth isn’t out there, and it never was. The FMA
thus teaches that originalist interpretation cannot keep its promise to
limit judicial discretion in the very cases in which that discretion is most
threatening.
Of course, that is a lot of weight to place on one datum. It is risky
business to attempt to generalize universal truths about constitutional interpretation from the particularities of one constitutional provision. And
that would seem to be especially true when the provision at issue not only
is uniquely recent (and thus the product of a very different era of lawmaking from the rest of the Constitution), but also was not even enacted
in the first place. I must therefore of course concede the possibility that
the lack of an original public meaning is peculiar to this particular
amendment and tells us nothing about the rest of the Constitution. But I
believe that there is nothing unique about the FMA in this respect; its
lack of an original meaning is related neither to its recent origins nor to
its failure to become law. It is, instead, an inherent, nearly unavoidable
feature of constitutional provisions addressing highly controversial
subjects.
To begin with, the fact that the FMA was not ratified by the states is
not particularly relevant. It is extremely likely that, had the Amendment
received sufficient support in Congress, it would have easily been ratified
by the states. As one Senator explained, “45 out of 50 States have either
adopted constitutional amendments or passed laws . . . defin[ing] marriage as the union of a man and a woman. To amend the Constitution,
you have to have . . . three-fourths of the State [sic]. We are already over
three-fourths of the States.”311 And there is no reason to believe either
that a shared public meaning would have somehow emerged during the
state ratification process or that the states would have declined to ratify
due to the ambiguity on the civil unions question. After so many years in
which a spirited debate failed to yield a single shared meaning, it is hard
to imagine that the people would somehow have settled (or insisted)
upon one during the state ratification process. Why should we expect
more of the state legislatures (each of which might of course have
reached a different understanding of the constitutional meaning, to the
extent that any understanding was ever reached at all) than of the
Congress? Indeed, at this same time, state law same-sex marriage bans
were being passed around the country extremely quickly and overwhelm-

311. 152 Cong. Rec. S5414 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
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ingly,312 often with little thought given to (or a with complete misunderstanding of) the effect that they would have on civil unions.313
Still, even if the lack of ratification by the states makes little difference, perhaps the FMA is unrepresentative because it did not even receive the necessary two-thirds vote in Congress. Maybe the fact that it fell
short in Congress in part as a result of impassioned denouncements of its
ambiguity tells us that vague provisions lacking a shared public meaning
will not make it into the Constitution. Indeed, maybe the FMA was just a
political stunt. Maybe its own proponents did not really want to see it
passed; they just wanted to force votes on a controversial wedge issue
before national elections. If that is so, then they probably paid much less
attention to the proposed language and its likely effects than they would
have had they been serious about amending the Constitution. The FMA
did, after all, bypass many of the legislative mechanisms—like full committee consideration and markups—that are designed to avoid this kind
of profound uncertainty.
But this argument too, I think, misses the mark. To begin with, it is
not as though the Amendment was drafted one day and voted on the
next, without any consideration of its meaning. The process dragged on
for years, with countless hearings and debates exploring its textual meaning.314 In addition, the FMA’s supporters really did want to see it enacted, even if they also relished the political value of forcing their opponents to cast unpopular votes.315 And it did receive majority votes in both
Houses of Congress.316 The reason that it did not receive two-thirds support had nothing to do with its ambiguous wording (indeed, the ambiguity only broadened its support); it was just that there was not quite
enough political support for amending the Constitution to address the
gay marriage issue.
312. See id. at S5415 (noting that average percentage of “yes” votes for same-sex ballot
referenda around the country was astounding 71.5%).
313. See supra notes 262–263 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S5417 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Brownback) (responding to argument that FMA was “being rushed to the floor and we
really don’t understand the ramifications of this particular constitutional amendment” by
“point[ing] out how much we have discussed this issue” and “point[ing] out that we have
had nine hearings on this subject from 2003, 2004, and 2005 . . . with legal experts and
scholars of [sic] what does this two-sentence constitutional amendment mean”).
315. See, e.g., id. at S5414 (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“Some say this is
something that was brought up by Congress in an election year . . . because we are
concerned about elections. But . . . that is not the case. I view this as foundational to this
society, to the future of the Republic. I think I am in pretty good company.”); Amy Fagan,
Marriage Bill Backed by Romney, Wash. Times, June 23, 2004, at A1 (noting
Representative DeLay’s long-term, carefully crafted plan to successfully enact
Amendment). Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the passion that committed
social conservatives bring to this issue. See, e.g., Shorto, supra note 264, at 37 (describing
anti-gay marriage movement).
316. See supra notes 236 and 241 and accompanying text.
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It is true that the Amendment was rushed to the floor for hurried
discussion and debate. And it is true that its supporters were often motivated by considerations of politics as much as (or more than) considerations of policy. And it is true that there was not as much attention paid to
clarifying the meaning of the language as there could have been. And it
is true that much of what both supporters and opponents said about the
Amendment may well have been propaganda, rather than reasoned, honest, dispassionate analysis of textual meaning. That is to say, the debate
may indeed have been characterized by cynical politicking: supporters
claiming that the Amendment means something other than what they
think it really means in order to trick others into supporting it, all the
while believing that once it is enacted, it will likely be found to have a
different meaning; and opponents claiming that the Amendment means
something other than what they think it really means in order to trick
others into opposing it, all the while believing that if they are unsuccessful in defeating it, it will likely be found to have a different meaning.
But—and this is the crucial point—none of this distinguishes the FMA
from other provisions of the Constitution addressing controversial
subjects.
The original Constitution was also drafted and ratified in a climate of
haste, propaganda, and political divisiveness, and was adopted in part for
political expediency. Representative Livingston, for instance, questioned
the usefulness of the ratification debates as a measure of constitutional
meaning because “they were called in haste, they were heated by party,
and many adopted [the Constitution] from expediency.”317 Indeed, it is
well known that “the battle waged over ratification in the press and at the
state conventions was quintessentially political, characterized by defenses
and attacks that were alternately genuine, hyperbolic, and obfuscatory.”318 As one leading historian has explained, the “ratification can be
depicted as a cacophonous debate” riddled with “squibs, parodies, wildly
fantastic predictions, and demagogic rhetoric.”319
The Anti-Federalists “described the Constitution’s provisions in
wildly hyperbolic terms in attempts to hasten its demise.”320 The
Federalists, for their part, “frequently exaggerated the degree of autonomy they expected and intended the Constitution to leave to the states in
a successful effort to allay localist fears.”321 Federalists who had advocated aggressively behind closed doors for a strong federal government
317. 5 Annals of Cong. 635 (1796).
318. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 217, 244–45 (2004) [hereinafter Smith,
Sources].
319. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587,
1600–01 (1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Fidelity].
320. Smith, Sources, supra note 318, at 248.
321. Powell, Rules, supra note 308, at 687; see also Smith, Sources, supra note 318, at
246 (noting that “there is little doubt that most prominent Federalists hoped to
circumscribe state authority more severely than their polemics let on”).
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when hammering out the text of the Constitution turned around and
disingenuously spoke of the Constitution as preserving a substantial degree of state autonomy when promoting it to the public.322 Indeed,
Madison himself later cautioned against use of The Federalist as evidence
of constitutional meaning because “it is fair to keep in mind that the
authors might be sometimes influenced by the zeal of advocates.”323
Not surprisingly, this atmosphere of propaganda, haste, and gamesmanship produced a Constitution whose language was profoundly ambiguous and whose meaning was, even at the time, admittedly obscure. In
some state ratifying conventions, the language clearly meant different
things to different speakers.324 And the problem only deepened across
state lines. As Justice Story long-ago explained, “[i]n different States and
in different conventions, different and very opposite objections are
known to have prevailed . . . . Opposite interpretations, and different
explanations of different provisions, may well be presumed to have been
presented in different bodies to remove local objections, or to win local
favor.”325 Both the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists agreed that many
of the crucial provisions of the Constitution were, to use Madison’s own
description of his handiwork, “obscure and equivocal.”326 The records of
the North Carolina ratification convention recount the frustration of one
opponent of the Constitution who
observed that gentlemen of the law and men of learning did not
concur in the explanation or meaning of this Constitution. For
his part, he said, he could not understand it, although he took
great pains to find out its meaning, and although he flattered
himself with the possession of common sense and reason . . . .

322. See Smith, Sources, supra note 318, at 248.
323. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), in 3 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison, 1816–1828, at 435, 435–36 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1865); see Eskridge, Supreme Court, supra note 299, at 1309 (“The
Federalist’s assertions are not necessarily representative of the views of others or even of
their own authors . . . [b]ecause they were propaganda documents, seeking (often
disingenuously) to rebut the arguments of the Anti-Federalists . . . .”).
324. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
519, 585 (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Interpretive Conventions] (“Because the states had
different concerns and different backgrounds, interpretations that prevailed in one state
might have been rejected in others.”).
325. 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 406
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
326. The Federalist No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
Nelson, Interpretive Conventions, supra note 324, at 521 (“James Madison and other
prominent founders did not consider the Constitution’s meaning to be fully settled at the
moment it was written. They recognized that it contained ambiguities . . . .”); id. at 525
(“During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists complained that the Constitution’s
language was ambiguous and obscure.”).
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From the contrariety of opinions, he thought the thing was either uncommonly difficult, or absolutely unintelligible.327
Yet political considerations prompted patriots to vote for it anyway.
Edmund Randolph, for instance, lamented at the Virginia convention:
“My objection is, that the [Constitution] is ambiguous, and that that ambiguity may injure the states. . . . But, sir, are we to reject it, because it is
ambiguous in some particular instances? . . . [I]ts adoption is necessary to
avoid the storm which is hanging over America . . . .”328
A similar story can be told about the Bill of Rights. As one prominent constitutional historian has famously concluded, “the Bill of Rights
was more the chance product of political expediency on all sides than of
principled commitment to personal liberties.”329 Madison, the primary
author and congressional advocate of the Bill of Rights, had been adamantly opposed to the entire concept during the ratification of the original Constitution.330 His eventual support for the amendments was purely
political—“dictated by the fact that he had to do so or lose his political
hide in Virginia.”331 He and other Federalists had promised a bill of
rights to the Anti-Federalists in return for their votes to ratify the
Constitution, and he was begrudgingly making good on his promise. He
was “not advocating them for their substance,” but rather only because it
was “politically expedient.”332 He could personally say little more in their
favor than that they were “neither improper nor altogether useless.”333
The rest of the Congress, and the state legislatures, showed little interest
in the amendments or their wording, and thus the Bill of Rights was
“adopted hastily, casually, virtually (it seems) without interest or reflec327. Andrew Bass Thinks the Constitution Is “Uncommonly Difficult, or Absolutely
Unintelligible”; Maclaine and Iredell Respond: July 29, 1788, in 2 The Debate on the
Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the
Struggle over Ratification 897 (1993); see also Theophilus Parsons, Notes of Convention
Debates (Jan. 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 1294, 1297 (2000) (statement of Samuel Thompson at Massachusetts
convention) (“The Constitution is in doubtful terms; it can’t be understood.”); The Daily
Advertiser, June 22, 1789, reprinted in 11 Documentary History of the First Federal
Congress of the United States of America 895, 902 (1992) (statement of Rep. Elbridge
Gerry on June 17, 1789) (insisting that Constitution “was in many parts obscure and
unintelligible”).
328. The States Rights Debate 160 (Alpheus Thomas Mason ed., 2d ed. 1972).
329. Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History:
Legacy of Suppression, at xxi–xxii (1963).
330. See Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional
Interpretation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 435, 461–63 (1996) [hereinafter Finkelman,
Intentionalism] (reviewing Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution (1996)).
331. Merrill Jensen, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 456, 458 (1961) (reviewing
Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American
History (1960)).
332. Finkelman, Intentionalism, supra note 330, at 464.
333. 1 Annals of Cong. 453 (1789).

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-3\COL301.txt

unknown

Seq: 65

25-MAR-08

2008] FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND ORIGINALISM

12:26

593

tion.”334 Not surprisingly, then, the finished product was riddled with
ambiguities.335
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment—the source of most of the contentious modern individual rights decisions of the Supreme Court—was,
of course, also enacted out of a sense of urgency in a highly political
environment. Its rights-bearing clauses were “little discussed or debated
at the time,”336 and its language was, even then, recognized to be highly
ambiguous and indeterminate.337 Indeed, scholars have suggested that
its authors and sponsors—whose remarks are most often looked to today
as proof of its original meaning—may have intentionally misrepresented
its meaning on the floor of the Congress, “endeavoring to bring a
wooden horse into the Constitution” in order to commit “fraud on the
nation.”338
None of this should be at all surprising. The “widely accepted theory
that ambiguity enables compromise” is a “staple of public choice literature.”339 This theory posits that ambiguity is often a natural result of the
legislative process. Drafting text that can be read to support two or more
inconsistent positions allows legislators and interest groups with divergent
goals to join together to provide enough support to enact a law. Each
group “hope[s] that its position will ultimately prevail, and ambiguity
thereby expands the circle of winners in legislative battles, at least
temporarily.”340
334. Steven D. Smith, The Writing of the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall,
19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 391, 397 (1996).
335. To take just one example, Leonard Levy explains that the congressional debate
on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “was apathetic and unclear: ambiguity,
brevity, and imprecision in thought and expression characterized the comments of the few
members who spoke. That the House understood the debate, cared deeply about its
outcome, or shared a common understanding of the finished amendment is doubtful.”
Leonard W. Levy, Constitutional Opinions: Aspects of the Bill of Rights 147 (1986).
336. Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 457, 459 (1996).
337. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political
Principle to Judicial Doctrine 2–5 (1988) (noting that quality historical scholarship has
reached widely differing conclusions on original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment);
Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 42 (noting that meaning of Due Process Clause was
“amorphous and undeveloped” at the time).
338. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 137 (1949).
339. Mark Moller, Class Action Lawmaking: An Administrative Law Model, 11 Tex.
Rev. L. & Pol. 39, 91 (2006).
340. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev.
627, 641 (2002); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications
of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 288 (1988) (“[A
legislative] strategy [where compromise is impossible] will be to support an ambiguous law,
with details to be filled in later by courts or agencies. . . . [T]he legislator will be able to
assure each group that it won, and . . . blame a court or agency if subsequent developments
belie that assurance.”).
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This theory holds especially true in constitutional law. The
Constitution is particularly susceptible to this phenomenon because of
the daunting supermajority required to enact or amend it. The greater
the degree of agreement necessary in order to enact a potentially controversial law, the greater the degree of ambiguity necessary to achieve the
requisite agreement. Those provisions of the Constitution that had little
potential for controversy—either because of widespread political agreement or because their subject matter simply did not provoke the interest
of the American people—may well have been drafted in concrete terms
with a shared public meaning. But when it came to provisions that addressed high-profile issues on which the American people were not overwhelmingly of one mind, substantial ambiguity was unavoidable.341 The
requirements of two-thirds support in both Houses of Congress and ratification in three-quarters of the states naturally push potentially controversial constitutional language in the direction of vague or ambiguous directives that mean very different things to the various groups with divergent
interests that must join together to enact them.342
341. One might initially suppose that the Eighteenth Amendment is inconsistent with
this theory. One law professor wrote in 1928 that “[n]ational prohibition is the largest
political issue the American people have grappled with since the Civil War.” Howard Lee
McBain, Prohibition Legal and Illegal 14 (1928). Robert Post explains that “national
prohibition was divisive from the start.” Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the
Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2006). And yet the language of the Eighteenth Amendment
seems straightforward and unambiguous. But in fact, the Eighteenth Amendment was
enacted during a brief window in which national prohibition enjoyed overwhelming
support among the American people as a result of the momentary confluence of the
interests of the conservative religious temperance crusaders, the liberal progressive
reformers, and the business community. This was heightened by the frenzied nationalist
zeal of World War I, which featured a spirit of personal sacrifice (conserving the food
supply was essential, and using precious grains to make alcohol was considered wasteful)
and anti-German sentiment (the American brewing industry was dominated by despised
German immigrants). See Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment 240
(1995); David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition 5–13 (Kent State Univ. Press 2000)
(1979); Post, supra, at 12–18. Congress hastily enacted the Eighteenth Amendment
without holding committee hearings and with very little debate. See Hamm, supra, at 240.
And the amendment was, in fact, highly ambiguous on several important fronts, from the
question whether the ban on “intoxicating liquors” would include beer (many of the
amendment’s supporters assumed that it would not, as had been the case with many state
prohibition laws, see Kyvig, supra, at 13), to the question whether the states would be
entitled to draft and enforce less draconian prohibition laws than the federal law (“key
members of the body that created the [amendment’s] language disagreed” on this point
and “the vagueness of the language allowed the drys to push the most stringent
interpretation” successfully in subsequent litigation, Hamm, supra, at 249).
342. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1–2 (noting that, in drafting “controversial
piece[s] of legislation . . . language sometimes is chosen precisely because of its
indeterminacy,” and observing that, “[w]hen it comes to crafting constitutional text, highly
general and ambiguous text may be better able to obtain the requisite supermajority
support than a more specific proposal because it means, if not all things to all people,
many things to most”).
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In the case of the Federal Marriage Amendment, the ambiguity appears to have been the necessary result of the fact that the Amendment
needed the support of two constituencies—moderate conservatives and
social conservatives—with diametrically opposed viewpoints on the civil
unions issue. Since Americans were roughly evenly divided into three
camps—those who supported gay marriage, those who opposed gay marriage but supported civil unions, and those who opposed both gay marriage and civil unions343—the only hope of obtaining supermajority support for a gay marriage ban was to phrase it in such an equivocal way that
all gay marriage opponents (both those who supported civil unions and
those who opposed them) could read it as adopting their position. It is
this phenomenon that accounts for the textual ambiguity.
This phenomenon is hardly unique to the FMA.344 As for the original Constitution, Paul Finkelman explains that, on many occasions at the
Philadelphia convention, “the delegates labored to create language that
was not designed to clarify, but rather to obfuscate in order to confuse
the electorate,” because they “self-consciously believed that they had to
hide what they were doing in order to win ratification.”345 For instance,
the use of vague language allowed the Northern delegates to tell their
constituents that the Constitution did not support slavery and the
Southern delegates to tell their constituents that it did.346 As for the Bill
of Rights, Madison confessed that intentional ambiguity was the name of
the game; he reported that in crafting the broad, open-ended language
of the Bill of Rights “[e]very thing of a controvertible nature that might
endanger the concurrence of two-thirds of each House and three-fourths
of the States was studiously avoided.”347 The people could all agree to
support constitutional protection for the freedom of speech, for instance,
only because the vague and lofty First Amendment does not clarify what
343. See PollingReport.com, supra note 35.
344. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution 6 (1996) (arguing against “notion that the Constitution had some fixed
and well-known meaning at the time of its adoption” in part on ground that “[b]oth the
framing of the Constitution in 1787 and its ratification by the states involved . . .
agreements to disagree”); Powell, Rules, supra note 308, at 670 (“[T]here is evidence that
the original founders may have employed this strategy of refusing to decide what the text
meant more often than we might think.”).
345. Finkelman, Intentionalism, supra note 330, at 445.
346. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of
Jefferson 34–36 (2d ed. 2001).
347. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 12 The
Papers of James Madison 272 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979); see also Daniel L.
Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth, 48 Baylor L. Rev. 927, 962 n.161
(1996) (noting that Framers of Bill of Rights “deliberately chose ambiguous,
noncontroversial language that would quickly win acceptance by all”); Rosenthal, supra
note 6, at 35–36 (“Madison was under considerable pressure to develop formulations that
would enjoy wide support in order to defuse the growing political pressure for a new
constitutional convention. . . . Perhaps Madison’s use of a novel and as yet not fully defined
formulation would help to bridge the gap between the [opposing] camps . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
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that freedom entails. Had it attempted to do so, it could never have been
enacted; the Framers did not agree on the proper scope of the freedom
of speech and had widely divergent understandings of the meaning of the
First Amendment.348 And finally, as for the Fourteenth Amendment, one
Representative sarcastically said of the author of its textually amorphous
rights provisions—Representative Bingham, whom Justice Black called
“the Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment”349—that
the Amendment’s “‘euphony and indefiniteness of meaning were a
charm to him.’”350 Issues of racial equality and of federal constraints on
the states’ ability to interfere with personal liberty were so touchy and
divisive in the aftermath of the Civil War that an amendment written in
concrete terms, rather than soaring and ambiguous platitudes, would
never have stood a chance.
John Hart Ely has explained of American constitutionalism that
“[o]ne of the reasons the debate culminates in a vote on an authoritative
text is to generate a record of just what there was sufficient agreement on
to gain [super]majority consent.”351 But originalists are mistaken in assuming that the fact that there was a successful vote means that there was
indeed agreement on the meaning of the text. In other words, there is
serious reason to question the underlying premise of originalist thought
that the “Constitution had to be drafted so as to be comprehensible to
the public that must give effect and authority to it. In ratifying the document, the people appropriated it, giving its text the meaning that was
publicly understood.”352 When it came to controversial subjects, the constitutional language that emerged from the drafting process was generally
capable of supporting more than one meaning, and the people were able
to ratify it only because they did not agree on which of its possible meanings was correct.
As such, what makes the Federal Marriage Amendment different
from the potentially controversial provisions of the original Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction amendments is not that it was
uniquely lacking in an original public meaning. Rather, it is that we have
so much evidence substantiating the lack of an original public meaning.
On virtually every important constitutional question, the historical
sources are mixed, such that advocates on each side can find evidence
348. See Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context: The Contributions of William Van
Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation, 54 Duke L.J. 1623, 1634–35 (2005) (“[A]mong
those select Framers who thought about the [meaning of the First Amendment] at all,
different Framers thought different things.”).
349. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
350. Fairman, supra note 338, at 19 (quoting 2 Sixty Years of Public Affairs 41
(1902)).
351. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 17 (1980).
352. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 274, at 60; see also, e.g.,
Meese, Original Intent, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that originalism “assume[s] that the
Constitution possessed a discernable meaning, intended and understood by those who
framed, proposed, and ratified its various parts”).
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that their preferred meaning was the original public one.353 But typically, when dealing with older provisions, the record is also sparse, such
that advocates can dismiss the slim contrary evidence as either aberrational or misconstrued, and can be genuinely convinced that theirs is the
true original meaning.354
Here, the jig is up. There is simply too much evidence on both sides
of the civil unions question to reach a confident conclusion either way.
None of the evidence has been lost to history, and there was just plain
more of it to begin with. This is the age of information. While we may
have fewer personal letters and diaries to draw upon in interpreting recent events than ancient ones, we have far more extensive, complete, and
word-for-word accurate records of legislative deliberations and public discussion. Thus, the FMA provides an incontrovertible demonstration of
what is likely a near-universal truth of constitutional interpretation:
There was no publicly shared original meaning of the provisions of the
Constitution that addressed subjects that were, or had the potential to be,
highly controversial at the time of enactment.
But what about original, objective-public-meaning textualism? It appears to be targeted at avoiding precisely this objection. It does not care
whether there was, in fact, a shared public meaning. It seeks only to determine the meaning that the public would have understood had it been
fully educated (and not misled). Yes, objective-public-meaning textualism fails in interpreting the FMA, but could that be seen as the peculiar
result of the fact that the FMA uniquely seeks to define a contentious
term, unlike the rest of the Constitution, which uses settled terms to establish fixed law?
In a word, no. The Constitution is not composed entirely of settled
terms with clear, objective meanings. Jefferson Powell has noted “the incredible linguistic creativity of the founders” and the “new and utterly
non-standard uses the founders made of” language.355 Madison himself
remarked that “no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas,” and he explained that the inherent ambiguity
of language is magnified by “the complexity and novelty of the objects
defined” in the Constitution.356
353. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 909, 909–13 (1998) (explaining that judges and scholars have reached wildly
divergent conclusions on original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
354. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 10–21 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Ninth Amendment] (noting that
scholars have articulated and defended five distinct originalist models of meaning of Ninth
Amendment); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 Const. Comment. 271, 278 (2005) (noting that thinness of historical evidence
of original meaning naturally makes outcome of originalist inquiry unpredictable).
355. Powell, Rules, supra note 308, at 679.
356. The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 326, at 198.
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Original, objective-public-meaning textualism might well be successful in interpreting some of the more technical provisions of the
Constitution. But it is the rights-bearing provisions—principally the Bill
of Rights and the various clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment—that most concern originalists who worry about judicial activism.357 These are the most open-ended and textually vague provisions
in the charter—the provisions that least lend themselves to a purely textualist interpretation. Looking up “due” and “process” in an eighteenth- or
nineteenth-century dictionary is not likely to help ascertain the objective
meaning of the Due Process Clauses, nor is a comprehensive analysis of
how those words were typically used in contemporary discourse. “Due
process,” “equal protection of the law,” “freedom of speech,” “establishment of religion,” “privileges and immunities,” and the like are often
terms of art whose content was defined, if at all, through practice and
historical context. As such, their original objective meaning, to the extent that they ever had one, can be ascertained only by examining the
historical evidence of the actual intent and understanding of the Framers
and the public. The inquiry necessarily collapses back into an examination of the drafting history, the ratification debates, and the public discussion of the meaning and effect of the amendment.358 In other words, as
prominent originalists Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash have explained, “everyone agrees” that “there is a range of genuine textual ambiguity about the original meaning” of the principal rights-bearing clauses,
such that “the constitutional text, read alone, can give only incomplete
answers as to the original understanding. The originalist inquiry, then,
has usually been pushed back from purely textual arguments to arguments based on evidence from the Constitution’s enactment and postenactment history.”359
It follows, as Caleb Nelson explains, that when the history fails to
yield a single publicly shared understanding of constitutional meaning,
the original objective-public-meaning textualist will usually be at a loss:
357. See, e.g., Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 17–18, 129, 353.
358. See, e.g., Nelson, Interpretive Conventions, supra note 324, at 557 (noting that
“modern originalist scholarship often uses the actual understandings expressed by
individual framers or ratifiers as evidence of the ‘original meaning’—the meaning that an
objectively reasonable person, using words in the way that people used them at the time of
the framing . . . , would have understood the Constitution to have”); Rakove, Fidelity, supra
note 319, at 1594–95 (noting that it “is true in all the interesting cases” that original textual
meaning is ambiguous, which forces originalists to turn to evidence of actual historical
understanding of that meaning).
359. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 556 (1994) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Barnett, Ninth
Amendment, supra note 354, at 7 (arguing that, because language of Ninth Amendment is
so open-ended, its original public meaning can be determined only by looking to original
public understanding); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1197–1204 (arguing that, for
original, objective-public-meaning textualists, evidence of drafting history is not only
relevant, but is often more helpful than dictionaries).
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Most of the framers and ratifiers were smart people who were
familiar with the art of reading and writing legal documents. If
a significant number of them genuinely understood a constitutional provision in a certain way, they probably had some objective basis for their interpretation. When they were sharply divided about the best interpretation of some provision, one
might therefore expect to find objectively reasonable arguments
on both sides. Thus, in the very cases where divisions among the
framers and ratifiers make the “original [understanding]” indeterminate, the “original meaning” is likely to be similarly
indeterminate.360
As such, however useful this methodology might be in interpreting
other provisions of the Constitution, it falters in interpreting the very provisions that are the primary target of originalism’s constraining
promise.361
CONCLUSION
The promise of originalism, however genuinely powerful the draw of
its siren song, is ultimately a false one. In the cases in which the fear of
judicial discretion is most acute, judges cannot render their decisions on
the basis of the original public meaning of the Constitution for the simple reason that there never was such a meaning. Thus, whether they like
it or not, judges are forced to look elsewhere in order to answer the most
provocative questions of constitutional law. Originalism quite often cannot meaningfully constrain judicial discretion.
To be sure, although the most famous and most influential originalists emphatically make the promise that this Article has sought to discredit, not all originalists have joined them. As Keith Whittington notes,
the recent generation of academic originalists place “less emphasis on the
capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge” than their
forebears.362 Whittington himself agrees that originalism is “unlikely to
provide the type of restraints on judicial decision making favored by some
of its advocates” and that it “cannot be expected to free judges from the
exercise of contestable interpretive judgment.”363 Whittington thus cautions that “[o]ur expectations for an originalist jurisprudence must be
lowered so that it can be evaluated more realistically and advocated more
persuasively.”364
360. Nelson, Interpretive Conventions, supra note 324, at 557 (footnote omitted).
361. Nelson further explains that, since the Framers did not agree on a shared set of
interpretive conventions, it is impossible to say that those provisions that lacked a shared
public meaning and were textually ambiguous nonetheless had a single original meaning
that naturally emerged from the application of universally accepted interpretive rules. See
id. at 560–78.
362. Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 1, at 608; see also John Harrison,
Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 83 (2003).
363. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 274, at 4.
364. Id.
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Indeed, originalists have long acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the second prong of the originalist endeavor: applying the original
public meaning to a contemporary problem. Even Judge Bork has conceded that “two judges equally devoted to the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of the principle at stake and so arrive
at different results.”365 That is especially true when the original meaning
is articulated at a high level of generality.366 Most originalists agree that
judges should state the principle reflected in the constitutional provision
at the level of generality on which the provision was originally understood
to operate—itself an aspect of its original meaning.367 Of course, the
higher the level of generality, the more indeterminate the second stage of
the originalist inquiry will be, and thus the less capable originalism will be
of fulfilling its promise to constrain judicial discretion.368
365. Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 163.
366. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 8, at 264, 268–69.
367. See, e.g., Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 149–50; Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 274, at 187; McConnell, Importance of Humility, supra note
271, at 1280. Objective-public-meaning textualists seek the level on which the provision is
objectively read to operate. See Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 644–45.
368. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 251, at 8 & n.26 (noting that reading original
meaning at high level of generality “sacrifice[s] originalism’s pretensions to serious
historical inquiry and its promise to impose meaningful constraints on judges”); Jed
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 432 n.25 (1997) (making similar
observation). To some liberal- or libertarian-leaning originalists, this is a good thing. See
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 7, 23 (2006) (arguing that flexibility that comes from higher levels of generality “is
not a bug” of originalism; rather, “[i]t’s a feature”). Higher levels of generality allow the
Court to keep up with changing social mores and they justify—rather than reject—the
Court’s major rights decisions of the past half century. See, e.g., Balkin, Constitutional
Redemption, supra note 253 (manuscript at 26) (claiming that Fourteenth Amendment’s
broad language legitimizes results in major cases); Perry, Legitimacy, supra note 278, at
710 (arguing that “modern constitutional decisions found most objectionable by Robert
Bork and many others are, in the main, consistent with an originalist approach to
constitutional adjudication”). See generally Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living
Constitutionalism, 24 Const. Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5, on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting that, at the second stage of the inquiry, originalists
“occasionally smuggle doctrine, consequences, prudence, construction with a ‘liberty
presumption,’ practice, and political morality through the back door to keep originalism
palatable or to translate its historical commands for our time”). But see Calabresi, supra
note 277, at 1091–95 (criticizing high-level-of-generality theories of originalism for failing
to address problem of judicial subjectivity).
Some scholars have taken the level of generality concept to its limit, concluding that
the original meaning of some constitutional provisions was entirely nonoriginalist: The
provisions were originally understood to delegate power to the judiciary to establish
(rather than just apply) their core principles. See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption,
supra note 253 (manuscript at 33) (Section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment); Rosenthal,
supra note 6, passim (Due Process Clauses); Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 1, at
611 (noting possibility “that the founders merely meant to delegate discretion to future
decisionmakers to act on a given subject matter with very little guidance as to how that
discretion should be used or on the substantive content of the principles on which those
decisionmakers should act”). In these instances, the “abstract text may be subject to
judicial manipulation, but its meaning is historically determined.” Id. That is to say, there
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It is therefore a misconception of originalism that it necessarily
promises (or that to succeed it must be able to produce) a conclusive
answer to every constitutional question, wholly untainted by judicial discretion.369 No constitutional theory could be held to such a standard,
and no sophisticated theorist would be arrogant enough to make such a
promise.
Indeed, some unconventional originalists are even willing to acknowledge substantial indeterminacy in the first stage of the originalist
inquiry—identifying the original meaning of the constitutional provision.
Michael Perry, for instance, has conceded that “often there will be available a range of historically plausible readings—some broader, some narrower—of the . . . original meaning” such that “[o]riginalist judges can,
and often will, disagree among themselves as to the original meaning of a
constitutional provision.”370
Gary Lawson has helpfully suggested that, in order to evaluate the
efficacy of originalism, we need to ascertain the “standard of proof” to
which we should hold applications of the theory.371 If we demand one
hundred percent certainty about the original meaning, then originalism
can never deliver. If, on the other hand, we are satisfied with applying
whichever meaning seems most likely to be the original one, then
originalism will virtually always be capable of resolving cases by reference
to historical norms; “[t]here almost always will be a best answer, even if
that answer does not command a high degree of confidence.”372 To the
extent that originalists have confronted this issue, they have tended toward the middle ground that originalism need only be able to determine
that a particular meaning is more likely than not the original public
one.373 Other originalists temper the threat of indeterminacy by arguing
that, whatever the standard of proof, originalism need not be able to
identify the one “true” meaning in order to constrain judges, because
even if it cannot determine which meaning is correct, it can still helpfully
narrow the universe of potential meanings by ruling out meanings that
were demonstrably not the original understanding of the people at the
time of ratification.374
These arguments reflect a sophisticated understanding of some of
the limits of originalism. But they are still premised on the notion that
there was a true original meaning of the Constitution. Why would we
was a shared original meaning, it was just a nonoriginalist one; the text was collectively
understood to delegate to the judiciary the authority to determine its core principles. This
argument, of course, differs from the argument that I am making here.
369. See, e.g., Lawson, Delegation, supra note 296, at 340 n.47.
370. Perry, Legitimacy, supra note 278, at 715.
371. See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 411, 418 (1995).
372. Id. at 421.
373. See, e.g., Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 649–50.
374. See, e.g., Lash, supra note 276, at 339–40; Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and
Indeterminacy, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 429, 431 (1995).
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care about the standard of proof necessary to establish a “fact” that never
existed? There is no point in demanding any particular degree of persuasiveness in our ability to fool ourselves. And while it is certainly true that
originalism can identify some meanings that are demonstrably not rooted
in history, there is little logic in labeling those meanings as “wrong” answers if we understand that the question is pointless and has no “right”
answer.375
What is more, while these modern originalists have shown a great
deal of humility in their thought, they can go only so far in making concessions to reality before originalism ceases to have any meaning. If
originalists really mean to concede that their theory is profoundly limited
and chronically indeterminate—such that most of the hard questions of
constitutional interpretation will have to be resolved by reference to values other than those demonstrably memorialized in the text—then they
have reneged on its promise.376 That is certainly something that the standard bearers of the originalist movement are unwilling to do. Judge
Bork, for instance, insists that it will only be on “rare occasions” that a
judge “cannot discover what a constitutional provision means.”377 Justice
Scalia similarly decrees that, for “the vast majority of questions,” judges
can indeed “find the correct historical answer.”378 Even moderate
originalists generally believe that the “Constitution is not radically
indeterminate.”379
Indeed, if they believed otherwise, they wouldn’t be originalists. To
walk too far down the path of qualifying the promise of originalism is to
abandon the entire premise of originalism—that the Constitution “has a
fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those
learned in the law.”380 The ability to “provide reasonably determinable
answers” is “a sine qua non for originalism.”381
375. As Alexander Bickel once said, “[n]o answer is what the wrong question begets.”
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103 (1962).
376. See Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
69, 73–74 (2003) (noting that notion of originalism constraining judicial discretion
“obviously depends on some objective claim to truth in historical inquiry”).
377. Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 165.
378. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 863; see also Scalia, Common-Law Courts,
supra note 6, at 45 (arguing that original meaning is usually “easy to discern and simple to
apply”).
379. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 274, at 207; see also id. at
162; Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 649–50 (arguing that recent scholarship has
determined original meaning of even open-ended and obscure constitutional provisions).
380. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 854.
381. Paul Horwitz, Book Note, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and the Crisis
of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 459, 476 (1998); see also Rakove,
Fidelity, supra note 319, at 1588 (“Originalism makes little sense if we lack confidence in
our capacity to produce reasonably authoritative conclusions about the original meanings,
intentions, and understandings underlying particular provisions of the Constitution.”);
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 793 (1983) (explaining that originalism “requires
both definite answers (because it is part of a legal system in which judgment is awarded to
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In fact, many originalists believe that if a judge cannot ascertain the
original meaning of a constitutional provision, she should treat it like an
“ink blot” on the Constitution, in Judge Bork’s famous phrase. That is to
say, if she cannot tell what the original framing supermajority decided,
she must respect the will of the current majority that enacted the statute
under review, rather than allow her own (unelected) will to undermine
democracy.382 But if the original meaning of the most litigated provisions of the Constitution is consistently unknowable (indeed, nonexistent), then originalism is not a theory of judicial review at all; it is an
abdication of judicial review. Judges cannot serve as an effective bulwark
of individual liberty against the tyranny of the majority if they routinely
decline to enforce virtually all constitutional rights. It is implicit in the
mandate that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is”383 that the answer cannot routinely be
“we don’t know.”384
one side or the other) and clear answers (because it seeks to constrain judges and thereby
to avoid judicial tyranny)”).
382. See, e.g., Bork, Tempting, supra note 7, at 166–67 (“If the meaning of the
Constitution is unknowable . . . judges must stand aside and let current democratic
majorities rule . . . .”); Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 274, at 5–14,
204–12; Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 359, 361
(1987) (arguing that where judge “cannot tell whether a challenged governmental action is
forbidden by the Constitution, then he is free to leave the determination of the legal rule
to the elected authorities”); William J. Michael, When Originalism Fails, 25 Whittier L. Rev.
497, 506–07, 515 (2004) (“[W]hen originalism fails, there is no reason to have unelected,
unaccountable judges, who are very much removed from the people, decide important
social issues.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289, 296 n.18 (2005) (arguing that “indeterminacy implies
broader political, democratic discretion, not broader judicial discretion”).
383. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
384. To be sure, there may be some instances in which an honest originalist judge
would be capable of deciding a case even under an ambiguous and controversial
constitutional provision. Under the FMA, for instance, a state law granting “marriage”
rights to same-sex couples would clearly be unconstitutional. But that is not because the
FMA has a single original meaning; rather, it is because the same result is commanded
under any of the competing understandings of its possible meaning. Whether one
interprets the FMA to reserve only the word “marriage” to opposite-sex couples, or instead
to reserve the entire institution of marriage to opposite-sex couples, it is violated by a
statute that allows same-sex couples to “marry.” Thus, an originalist judge could feel
comfortable declaring that a same-sex marriage statute violates the original meaning of the
FMA, even though she could not articulate just what that original meaning is. The same is
surely true of paradigm cases under other vague rights-granting clauses. Under any
plausible candidate for the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, it would
surely be unconstitutional to fine African Americans for being black; under any plausible
candidate for the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses, it would surely be
unconstitutional to impose a prior restraint on the publication of anti-government
newspaper editorials; et cetera.
But those are the easiest of the easy cases. If originalists are correct that
“constitutional construction”—–the process of giving content to ambiguous constitutional
provisions that lack a clear original meaning—–generally must be carried out by
democratic institutions, not judges, see, e.g., Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation,
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Originalism thus depends upon the premise that the original meaning of the Constitution is generally knowable, which in turn depends
upon the premise that there was indeed an original meaning of the
Constitution in the first place—that, in Justice Scalia’s words, there is a
“correct historical answer.”385 That is the premise upon which originalism bases its promise generally to be able to prevent judges from undermining democratic government. Yet the premise is flawed, and thus the
promise is false.
To be fair, I offer no alternative to originalism here. I confess to
being drawn to notions of “soft originalism”—originalism at a high level
of generality, tempered with precedent and common law decisionmaking. But I freely admit that any such jurisprudence offers dubious constraints on judicial will. Indeed, I have yet to find a sensible constitutional theory that can do what I am accusing originalism of failing to
do—perfectly constrain the will of judges. In this respect, I am certainly
taking the easy way out. But sometimes it doesn’t take a theory to beat a
theory386; some theories beat themselves. Or more accurately in these
circumstances, some theories are beaten by reality. Perhaps there is a
workable jurisprudence that would eliminate undesirable judicial subjecsupra note 274, at 204–08, and if I am correct that virtually all of the most litigated
constitutional provisions lack an original meaning, then judges are limited to acting only
in this lilliputian category of simple cases. Marbury, however, seems to presuppose that
judges have a duty to determine and enforce the meaning of the Constitution in most
cases–—not just the easiest ones. (Indeed, the meaning of the constitutional provision at
issue in Marbury itself was anything but clear. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 30–33.) Cf. Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court
and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 612, 624 (2006) (arguing that “the
ratification debates suggest something of a consensus (at least between warring Federalist
and Anti-Federalist camps) that case-by-case adjudication in the courts would play a central
role in assigning fixed constitutional meaning when the text of the Constitution was
ambiguous”). And originalism, as I have noted, seems to presuppose the existence of a
discoverable original meaning of virtually every constitutional provision.
385. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 863. Even those originalists who justify
originalism on grounds other than its potential to overcome judicial activism are
dependent on this premise. Whether originalism is defended on the ground that it makes
pragmatic sense because principles that initially enjoyed broad supermajority support are
likely to produce net benefits, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic
Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383, 385–89 (2007), or on the ground that the
Constitution is a social contract, and the bargain actually struck by the people can only be
enforced by giving the contract the meaning that the people who agreed to it understood
it to have, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1119, 1121–22 (1998), or on the ground that the Constitution is law, and our legal
system presupposes that all written sources of law will be interpreted according to their
original meaning, see, e.g., Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 253
(manuscript at 3–7), it is necessarily premised on the notion that there exists a knowable
original meaning.
386. But see Barnett, An Originalism, supra note 6, at 617 (“It takes a theory to beat a
theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents of originalism have never congealed
around an appealing and practical alternative.”); Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 855
(“You can’t beat somebody with nobody.”).
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tivity, and perhaps there is not. But the answer does not lie in originalism. In reality, judges often cannot do the only thing that originalists
believe that, in theory, they are justified in doing—resolve constitutional
disputes on the basis of the original public meaning of the constitutional
text.387
Returning to the Federal Marriage Amendment, Judge Bork, the
great originalist, dismissed liberals’ concerns about its textual ambiguity
by opining that if “there were any ambiguities, courts that are inclined
toward civil unions would resolve them in that direction.”388 Eugene
Volokh wisely replied: “I actually agree with Judge Bork that courts that
are inclined toward civil unions would resolve ambiguities in favor of validating legislatively enacted civil unions. But my question is: What about
courts that are inclined against civil unions?”389 Despite the promise of
originalism, the potential for judicial subjectivity persists.

387. This does not mean, of course, that historical inquiry is pointless and evidence of
original meanings is irrelevant. “Almost no one believes that the original understanding is
wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.” Farber, supra note 17, at
1086. Even nonoriginalists care about history and seek to learn as much as they can about
original meaning. See James E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 Geo.
L.J. 1849, 1849 (1997). But to the nonoriginalist, historical indeterminacy is not
debilitating, because historical meaning is not dispositive. See Brown, supra note 376, at
79.
388. Cooperman, Little Consensus, supra note 32.
389. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
2004_02_15_volokh_archive.html (Feb. 17, 2004, 16:16 EST) (emphasis omitted) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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